Files
systemd/src/core/namespace.c

4058 lines
158 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include <linux/loop.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "base-filesystem.h"
#include "bitfield.h"
#include "chase.h"
#include "dev-setup.h"
#include "devnum-util.h"
#include "dissect-image.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "extension-util.h"
#include "extract-word.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "format-util.h"
#include "fs-util.h"
#include "glyph-util.h"
#include "label-util.h"
#include "list.h"
#include "lock-util.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "loop-util.h"
#include "loopback-setup.h"
#include "mkdir-label.h"
#include "mount-util.h"
#include "mountpoint-util.h"
#include "namespace.h"
#include "namespace-util.h"
#include "nsflags.h"
#include "nulstr-util.h"
#include "os-util.h"
#include "parse-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "pidref.h"
#include "process-util.h"
#include "selinux-util.h"
#include "socket-util.h"
#include "sort-util.h"
#include "stat-util.h"
#include "string-table.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
#include "tmpfile-util.h"
#include "umask-util.h"
#include "user-util.h"
#include "vpick.h"
#define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC)
typedef enum MountMode {
/* This is ordered by priority! */
MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE,
MOUNT_OVERLAY,
MOUNT_IMAGE,
MOUNT_BIND,
MOUNT_BIND_RECURSIVE,
MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMP,
MOUNT_PRIVATE_DEV,
MOUNT_BIND_DEV,
MOUNT_EMPTY_DIR,
MOUNT_PRIVATE_SYSFS,
MOUNT_BIND_SYSFS,
MOUNT_PROCFS,
MOUNT_PRIVATE_CGROUP2FS,
MOUNT_READ_ONLY,
MOUNT_READ_WRITE,
MOUNT_NOEXEC,
MOUNT_EXEC,
MOUNT_TMPFS,
MOUNT_RUN,
MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS, /* Mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
MOUNT_EXTENSION_DIRECTORY, /* Bind-mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE, /* Mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
MOUNT_MQUEUEFS,
MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
MOUNT_BPFFS, /* Special mount for bpffs, which is mounted with fsmount() and move_mount() */
_MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
_MOUNT_MODE_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} MountMode;
typedef enum MountEntryState {
MOUNT_PENDING,
MOUNT_APPLIED,
MOUNT_SKIPPED,
_MOUNT_ENTRY_STATE_MAX,
_MOUNT_ENTRY_STATE_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} MountEntryState;
typedef struct MountEntry {
const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */
MountMode mode;
bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */
bool has_prefix:1; /* Already prefixed by the root dir? */
bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */
bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */
bool noexec:1; /* Shall set MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
bool exec:1; /* Shall clear MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
bool create_source_dir:1; /* Create the source directory if it doesn't exist - for implicit bind mounts */
mode_t source_dir_mode; /* Mode for the source directory, if it is to be created */
MountEntryState state; /* Whether it was already processed or skipped */
char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */
const char *unprefixed_path_const; /* If the path was amended with a prefix, these will save the original */
char *unprefixed_path_malloc;
const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */
char *source_malloc;
const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */
char *options_malloc;
unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */
unsigned n_followed;
LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options_const);
char **overlay_layers;
VeritySettings verity;
ImageClass filter_class; /* Used for live updates to skip inapplicable images */
bool idmapped;
uid_t idmap_uid;
gid_t idmap_gid;
} MountEntry;
typedef struct MountList {
MountEntry *mounts;
size_t n_mounts;
} MountList;
static const BindMount bind_log_sockets_table[] = {
{ (char*) "/run/systemd/journal/socket", (char*) "/run/systemd/journal/socket", .read_only = true, .nosuid = true, .noexec = true, .nodev = true, .ignore_enoent = true },
{ (char*) "/run/systemd/journal/stdout", (char*) "/run/systemd/journal/stdout", .read_only = true, .nosuid = true, .noexec = true, .nodev = true, .ignore_enoent = true },
{ (char*) "/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", (char*) "/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", .read_only = true, .nosuid = true, .noexec = true, .nodev = true, .ignore_enoent = true },
};
/* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys, /proc, /dev and /run into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted
* something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */
static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = {
{ "/proc", MOUNT_PROCFS, false },
{ "/dev", MOUNT_BIND_DEV, false },
{ "/sys", MOUNT_BIND_SYSFS, false },
{ "/run", MOUNT_RUN, false, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_RUN, .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
};
/* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */
static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table[] = {
{ "/proc/acpi", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/proc/apm", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */
{ "/proc/asound", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/proc/bus", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/proc/fs", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/proc/irq", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/proc/kallsyms", MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE, true },
{ "/proc/kcore", MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE, true },
{ "/proc/latency_stats", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/proc/mtrr", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/proc/scsi", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/proc/sys", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/proc/sysrq-trigger", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/proc/timer_stats", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
};
static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table[] = {
{ "/sys", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, false },
{ "/sys/fs/cgroup", MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READ_ONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
{ "/sys/fs/selinux", MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT, true },
{ "/sys/kernel/debug", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/sys/kernel/tracing", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
};
/* PrivateBPF= option */
static const MountEntry private_bpf_no_table[] = {
{ "/sys/fs/bpf", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
};
/* ProtectKernelModules= option */
static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
{ "/usr/lib/modules", MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE, true },
};
/* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_proc_table[] = {
{ "/proc/kmsg", MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE, true },
};
static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_dev_table[] = {
{ "/dev/kmsg", MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE, true },
};
/*
* ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
* system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
*/
static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = {
{ "/home", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/run/user", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/root", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
};
/* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */
static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = {
{ "/home", MOUNT_TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
{ "/run/user", MOUNT_TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
{ "/root", MOUNT_TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
};
/* ProtectHome=yes table */
static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = {
{ "/home", MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE, true },
{ "/run/user", MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE, true },
{ "/root", MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE, true },
};
/* ProtectControlGroups=yes table */
static const MountEntry protect_control_groups_yes_table[] = {
{ "/sys/fs/cgroup", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, false },
};
/* ProtectControlGroups=private table. Note mount_private_apivfs() always use MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV so
* flags is not set here. */
static const MountEntry protect_control_groups_private_table[] = {
{ "/sys/fs/cgroup", MOUNT_PRIVATE_CGROUP2FS, false, .read_only = false },
};
/* ProtectControlGroups=strict table */
static const MountEntry protect_control_groups_strict_table[] = {
{ "/sys/fs/cgroup", MOUNT_PRIVATE_CGROUP2FS, false, .read_only = true },
};
/* ProtectSystem=yes table */
static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = {
{ "/usr", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, false },
{ "/boot", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/efi", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
};
/* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */
static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = {
{ "/usr", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, false },
{ "/boot", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/efi", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, true },
{ "/etc", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, false },
};
/* ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything read-only, except for /proc, /dev,
* /sys which are the kernel API VFS, which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables=
* protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal. (And of course /home and friends are also
* left writable, as ProtectHome= shall manage those, orthogonally).
*/
static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = {
{ "/", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, false },
{ "/proc", MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
{ "/sys", MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
{ "/dev", MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */
{ "/home", MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
{ "/run/user", MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
{ "/root", MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
};
/* ProtectHostname=yes able */
static const MountEntry protect_hostname_yes_table[] = {
{ "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, false },
{ "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname", MOUNT_READ_ONLY, false },
};
static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
[MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible",
[MOUNT_OVERLAY] = "overlay",
[MOUNT_IMAGE] = "image",
[MOUNT_BIND] = "bind",
[MOUNT_BIND_RECURSIVE] = "bind-recursive",
[MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp",
[MOUNT_PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev",
[MOUNT_BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev",
[MOUNT_EMPTY_DIR] = "empty-dir",
[MOUNT_PRIVATE_SYSFS] = "private-sysfs",
[MOUNT_BIND_SYSFS] = "bind-sysfs",
[MOUNT_PRIVATE_CGROUP2FS] = "private-cgroup2fs",
[MOUNT_PROCFS] = "procfs",
[MOUNT_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
[MOUNT_READ_WRITE] = "read-write",
[MOUNT_NOEXEC] = "noexec",
[MOUNT_EXEC] = "exec",
[MOUNT_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
[MOUNT_RUN] = "run",
[MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS] = "private-tmpfs",
[MOUNT_EXTENSION_DIRECTORY] = "extension-directory",
[MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE] = "extension-image",
[MOUNT_MQUEUEFS] = "mqueuefs",
[MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT] = "read-write-implicit",
};
/* Helper struct for naming simplicity and reusability */
static const struct {
const char *level_env;
const char *level_env_print;
} image_class_info[_IMAGE_CLASS_MAX] = {
[IMAGE_SYSEXT] = {
.level_env = "SYSEXT_LEVEL",
.level_env_print = " SYSEXT_LEVEL=",
},
[IMAGE_CONFEXT] = {
.level_env = "CONFEXT_LEVEL",
.level_env_print = " CONFEXT_LEVEL=",
}
};
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode);
static const char* mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
/* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that,
* otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */
return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const;
}
static const char* mount_entry_unprefixed_path(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
/* Returns the unprefixed path (ie: before prefix_where_needed() ran), if any */
return p->unprefixed_path_malloc ?: p->unprefixed_path_const ?: mount_entry_path(p);
}
static void mount_entry_consume_prefix(MountEntry *p, char *new_path) {
assert(p);
assert(p->path_malloc || p->path_const);
assert(new_path);
/* Saves current path in unprefixed_ variable, and takes over new_path */
free_and_replace(p->unprefixed_path_malloc, p->path_malloc);
/* If we didn't have a path on the heap, then it's a static one */
if (!p->unprefixed_path_malloc)
p->unprefixed_path_const = p->path_const;
p->path_malloc = new_path;
p->has_prefix = true;
}
static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, MOUNT_READ_ONLY, MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE);
}
static bool mount_entry_noexec(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
return p->noexec || IN_SET(p->mode, MOUNT_NOEXEC, MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE, MOUNT_PRIVATE_SYSFS, MOUNT_BIND_SYSFS, MOUNT_PROCFS, MOUNT_PRIVATE_CGROUP2FS);
}
static bool mount_entry_exec(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
return p->exec || p->mode == MOUNT_EXEC;
}
static const char* mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const;
}
static const char* mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const;
}
static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) {
assert(p);
p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc);
p->unprefixed_path_malloc = mfree(p->unprefixed_path_malloc);
p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc);
p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc);
p->overlay_layers = strv_free(p->overlay_layers);
verity_settings_done(&p->verity);
}
static void mount_list_done(MountList *ml) {
assert(ml);
FOREACH_ARRAY(m, ml->mounts, ml->n_mounts)
mount_entry_done(m);
ml->mounts = mfree(ml->mounts);
ml->n_mounts = 0;
}
static MountEntry* mount_list_extend(MountList *ml) {
assert(ml);
if (!GREEDY_REALLOC0(ml->mounts, ml->n_mounts+1))
return NULL;
return ml->mounts + ml->n_mounts++;
}
static int append_access_mounts(MountList *ml, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) {
assert(ml);
/* Adds a list of user-supplied READ_WRITE/READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT/READ_ONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */
STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false;
const char *e = *i;
/* Look for any prefixes */
if (startswith(e, "-")) {
e++;
ignore = true;
}
if (startswith(e, "+")) {
e++;
needs_prefix = true;
}
if (!path_is_absolute(e))
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Path is not absolute: %s", e);
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = e,
.mode = mode,
.ignore = ignore,
.has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix,
};
}
return 0;
}
static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountList *ml, char **strv) {
assert(ml);
/* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the
* "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */
STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = *i,
.mode = MOUNT_EMPTY_DIR,
.ignore = false,
.read_only = true,
.options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
};
}
return 0;
}
static int append_bind_mounts(MountList *ml, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) {
assert(ml);
assert(binds || n == 0);
FOREACH_ARRAY(b, binds, n) {
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = b->destination,
.mode = b->recursive ? MOUNT_BIND_RECURSIVE : MOUNT_BIND,
.read_only = b->read_only,
.nosuid = b->nosuid,
.noexec = b->noexec,
.flags = b->nodev ? MS_NODEV : 0,
.source_const = b->source,
.ignore = b->ignore_enoent,
.idmapped = b->idmapped,
.idmap_uid = b->uid,
.idmap_gid = b->gid,
};
}
return 0;
}
static int append_mount_images(MountList *ml, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) {
int r;
assert(ml);
assert(mount_images || n == 0);
FOREACH_ARRAY(m, mount_images, n) {
_cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT;
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
r = verity_settings_load(&verity, m->source, /* root_hash_path= */ NULL, /* root_hash_sig_path= */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to check verity root hash of %s: %m", m->source);
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = m->destination,
.mode = MOUNT_IMAGE,
.source_const = m->source,
.image_options_const = m->mount_options,
.ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
.verity = TAKE_GENERIC(verity, VeritySettings, VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT),
.filter_class = _IMAGE_CLASS_INVALID,
};
}
return 0;
}
static int append_extensions(
MountList *ml,
const char *root,
const char *private_namespace_dir,
char **hierarchies,
const MountImage *mount_images,
size_t n_mount_images,
char **extension_directories) {
char ***overlays = NULL;
size_t n_overlays = 0;
int r;
assert(ml);
if (n_mount_images == 0 && strv_isempty(extension_directories))
return 0;
assert(private_namespace_dir);
n_overlays = strv_length(hierarchies);
if (n_overlays == 0)
return 0;
/* Prepare a list of overlays, that will have as each element a strv containing all the layers that
* will later be concatenated as a lowerdir= parameter for the mount operation.
* The overlays vector will have the same number of elements and will correspond to the
* hierarchies vector, so they can be iterated upon together. */
overlays = new0(char**, n_overlays);
if (!overlays)
return -ENOMEM;
CLEANUP_ARRAY(overlays, n_overlays, strv_free_many);
/* First, prepare a mount for each image, but these won't be visible to the unit, instead
* they will be mounted in our propagate directory, and used as a source for the overlay. */
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_mount_images; i++) {
_cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT;
_cleanup_(pick_result_done) PickResult result = PICK_RESULT_NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL;
const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
r = path_pick(/* toplevel_path= */ NULL,
/* toplevel_fd= */ AT_FDCWD,
m->source,
&pick_filter_image_raw,
PICK_ARCHITECTURE|PICK_TRIES,
&result);
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore_enoent)
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (!result.path) {
if (m->ignore_enoent)
continue;
return log_debug_errno(
SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOENT),
"No matching entry in .v/ directory %s found.",
m->source);
}
r = verity_settings_load(&verity, result.path, /* root_hash_path= */ NULL, /* root_hash_sig_path= */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to check verity root hash of %s: %m", result.path);
if (asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/unit-extensions/%zu", private_namespace_dir, i) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
char *prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
return -ENOMEM;
r = strv_consume(&overlays[j], TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy));
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return -ENOMEM;
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
.image_options_const = m->mount_options,
.ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
.source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(result.path),
.mode = MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE,
.has_prefix = true,
.verity = TAKE_GENERIC(verity, VeritySettings, VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT),
.filter_class = _IMAGE_CLASS_INVALID,
};
}
/* Secondly, extend the lowerdir= parameters with each ExtensionDirectory.
* Bind mount them in the same location as the ExtensionImages, so that we
* can check that they are valid trees (extension-release.d). */
STRV_FOREACH(extension_directory, extension_directories) {
_cleanup_(pick_result_done) PickResult result = PICK_RESULT_NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL;
const char *e = *extension_directory;
bool ignore_enoent = false;
/* Look for any prefixes */
if (startswith(e, "-")) {
e++;
ignore_enoent = true;
}
/* Ignore this for now */
if (startswith(e, "+"))
e++;
r = path_pick(/* toplevel_path= */ NULL,
/* toplevel_fd= */ AT_FDCWD,
e,
&pick_filter_image_dir,
PICK_ARCHITECTURE|PICK_TRIES,
&result);
if (r == -ENOENT && ignore_enoent)
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (!result.path) {
if (ignore_enoent)
continue;
return log_debug_errno(
SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOENT),
"No matching entry in .v/ directory %s found.",
e);
}
/* Pick up the counter where the ExtensionImages left it. */
if (asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/unit-extensions/%zu", private_namespace_dir, n_mount_images++) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
char *prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
return -ENOMEM;
r = strv_consume(&overlays[j], TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy));
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return -ENOMEM;
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
.source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(result.path),
.mode = MOUNT_EXTENSION_DIRECTORY,
.ignore = ignore_enoent,
.has_prefix = true,
.read_only = true,
.filter_class = _IMAGE_CLASS_INVALID,
};
}
/* Then, for each hierarchy, prepare an overlay with the list of lowerdir= strings
* set up earlier. */
for (size_t i = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[i]; ++i) {
_cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, hierarchies[i]);
if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
return -ENOMEM;
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return -ENOMEM;
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy),
.overlay_layers = TAKE_PTR(overlays[i]),
.mode = MOUNT_OVERLAY,
.has_prefix = true,
.ignore = true, /* If the source image doesn't set the ignore bit it will fail earlier. */
};
}
return 0;
}
static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountList *ml, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) {
assert(ml);
assert(tmpfs || n == 0);
FOREACH_ARRAY(t, tmpfs, n) {
_cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
bool ro = false;
int r;
if (!path_is_absolute(t->path))
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Path is not absolute: %s", t->path);
str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str);
ro = flags & MS_RDONLY;
flags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = t->path,
.mode = MOUNT_TMPFS,
.read_only = ro,
.options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o),
.flags = flags,
};
}
return 0;
}
static int append_private_tmp(MountList *ml, const NamespaceParameters *p) {
MountEntry *me;
assert(ml);
assert(p);
assert(p->private_tmp == p->private_var_tmp ||
(p->private_tmp == PRIVATE_TMP_DISCONNECTED && p->private_var_tmp == PRIVATE_TMP_NO));
if (p->tmp_dir) {
assert(p->private_tmp == PRIVATE_TMP_CONNECTED);
me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/tmp/",
.mode = MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMP,
.read_only = streq(p->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY),
.source_const = p->tmp_dir,
};
}
if (p->var_tmp_dir) {
assert(p->private_var_tmp == PRIVATE_TMP_CONNECTED);
me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/var/tmp/",
.mode = MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMP,
.read_only = streq(p->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY),
.source_const = p->var_tmp_dir,
};
}
if (p->private_tmp != PRIVATE_TMP_DISCONNECTED)
return 0;
if (p->private_var_tmp == PRIVATE_TMP_NO) {
me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/tmp/",
.mode = MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS,
.options_const = "mode=0700" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS,
.flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
};
return 0;
}
_cleanup_free_ char *tmpfs_dir = NULL, *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL;
tmpfs_dir = path_join(p->private_namespace_dir, "unit-private-tmp");
tmp_dir = path_join(tmpfs_dir, "tmp");
var_tmp_dir = path_join(tmpfs_dir, "var-tmp");
if (!tmpfs_dir || !tmp_dir || !var_tmp_dir)
return log_oom_debug();
me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(tmpfs_dir),
.mode = MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS,
.options_const = "mode=0700" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS,
.flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
.has_prefix = true,
};
me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(tmp_dir),
.path_const = "/tmp/",
.mode = MOUNT_BIND,
.source_dir_mode = 01777,
.create_source_dir = true,
};
me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(var_tmp_dir),
.path_const = "/var/tmp/",
.mode = MOUNT_BIND,
.source_dir_mode = 01777,
.create_source_dir = true,
};
return 0;
}
static int append_static_mounts(MountList *ml, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) {
assert(ml);
assert(mounts || n == 0);
/* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */
FOREACH_ARRAY(m, mounts, n) {
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
/* No dynamic values allowed. */
assert(m->path_const);
assert(!m->path_malloc);
assert(!m->unprefixed_path_malloc);
assert(!m->source_malloc);
assert(!m->options_malloc);
assert(!m->overlay_layers);
*me = *m;
me->ignore = me->ignore || ignore_protect;
}
return 0;
}
static int append_protect_control_groups(MountList *ml, ProtectControlGroups protect_control_groups, bool ignore_protect) {
assert(ml);
switch (protect_control_groups) {
case PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_NO:
return 0;
case PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_YES:
return append_static_mounts(ml, protect_control_groups_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_control_groups_yes_table), ignore_protect);
case PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_PRIVATE:
return append_static_mounts(ml, protect_control_groups_private_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_control_groups_private_table), ignore_protect);
case PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_STRICT:
return append_static_mounts(ml, protect_control_groups_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_control_groups_strict_table), ignore_protect);
default:
assert_not_reached();
}
}
static int append_protect_home(MountList *ml, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) {
assert(ml);
switch (protect_home) {
case PROTECT_HOME_NO:
return 0;
case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY:
return append_static_mounts(ml, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect);
case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS:
return append_static_mounts(ml, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect);
case PROTECT_HOME_YES:
return append_static_mounts(ml, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect);
default:
assert_not_reached();
}
}
static int append_protect_system(MountList *ml, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) {
assert(ml);
switch (protect_system) {
case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO:
return 0;
case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT:
return append_static_mounts(ml, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect);
case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES:
return append_static_mounts(ml, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect);
case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL:
return append_static_mounts(ml, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect);
default:
assert_not_reached();
}
}
static int append_private_bpf(
MountList *ml,
PrivateBPF private_bpf,
bool protect_kernel_tunables,
bool ignore_protect,
const NamespaceParameters *p) {
assert(ml);
switch (private_bpf) {
case PRIVATE_BPF_NO:
if (protect_kernel_tunables)
return append_static_mounts(ml, private_bpf_no_table, ELEMENTSOF(private_bpf_no_table), ignore_protect);
return 0;
case PRIVATE_BPF_YES: {
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/sys/fs/bpf",
.mode = MOUNT_BPFFS,
};
return 0;
}
default:
assert_not_reached();
}
}
static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) {
int d;
/* ExtensionImages/Directories will be used by other mounts as a base, so sort them first
* regardless of the prefix - they are set up in the propagate directory anyway */
d = -CMP(a->mode == MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE, b->mode == MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE);
if (d != 0)
return d;
d = -CMP(a->mode == MOUNT_EXTENSION_DIRECTORY, b->mode == MOUNT_EXTENSION_DIRECTORY);
if (d != 0)
return d;
/* MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS needs to be set up earlier, especially than MOUNT_BIND. */
d = -CMP(a->mode == MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS, b->mode == MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS);
if (d != 0)
return d;
/* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */
d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b));
if (d != 0)
return d;
/* If the paths are equal, check the mode */
return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode);
}
static int prefix_where_needed(MountList *ml, const char *root_directory) {
/* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */
assert(ml);
FOREACH_ARRAY(me, ml->mounts, ml->n_mounts) {
char *s;
if (me->has_prefix)
continue;
s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(me));
if (!s)
return -ENOMEM;
mount_entry_consume_prefix(me, s);
}
return 0;
}
static bool verity_has_later_duplicates(MountList *ml, const MountEntry *needle) {
assert(ml);
assert(needle);
assert(needle >= ml->mounts && needle < ml->mounts + ml->n_mounts);
assert(needle->mode == MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE);
if (needle->verity.root_hash_size == 0)
return false;
/* Overlayfs rejects supplying the same directory inode twice as determined by filesystem UUID and
* file handle in lowerdir=, even if they are mounted on different paths, as it resolves each mount
* to its source filesystem, so drop duplicates, and keep the last one. This only covers non-DDI
* verity images. Note that the list is ordered, so we only check for the reminder of the list for
* each item, rather than the full list from the beginning, as any earlier duplicates will have
* already been pruned. */
for (const MountEntry *m = needle + 1; m < ml->mounts + ml->n_mounts; m++) {
if (m->mode != MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE)
continue;
if (memcmp_nn(m->verity.root_hash,
m->verity.root_hash_size,
needle->verity.root_hash,
needle->verity.root_hash_size) == 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}
static void drop_duplicates(MountList *ml) {
MountEntry *f, *t, *previous;
assert(ml);
/* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */
for (f = ml->mounts, t = ml->mounts, previous = NULL; f < ml->mounts + ml->n_mounts; f++) {
/* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare()
* above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */
if (previous &&
path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) &&
f->state == MOUNT_PENDING && previous->state == MOUNT_PENDING) {
log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode));
/* Propagate the flags to the remaining entry */
previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f);
previous->noexec = previous->noexec || mount_entry_noexec(f);
previous->exec = previous->exec || mount_entry_exec(f);
mount_entry_done(f);
continue;
}
if (f->mode == MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE && verity_has_later_duplicates(ml, f)) {
log_debug("Skipping duplicate extension image %s", mount_entry_source(f));
mount_entry_done(f);
continue;
}
*t = *f;
previous = t;
t++;
}
ml->n_mounts = t - ml->mounts;
}
static void drop_inaccessible(MountList *ml) {
MountEntry *f, *t;
const char *clear = NULL;
assert(ml);
/* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly
* ordered already. */
for (f = ml->mounts, t = ml->mounts; f < ml->mounts + ml->n_mounts; f++) {
/* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop
* it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */
if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) {
log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear);
mount_entry_done(f);
continue;
}
clear = f->mode == MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL;
*t = *f;
t++;
}
ml->n_mounts = t - ml->mounts;
}
static void drop_nop(MountList *ml) {
MountEntry *f, *t;
assert(ml);
/* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the
* list is ordered by prefixes. */
for (f = ml->mounts, t = ml->mounts; f < ml->mounts + ml->n_mounts; f++) {
/* Only suppress such subtrees for READ_ONLY, READ_WRITE and READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT entries */
if (IN_SET(f->mode, MOUNT_READ_ONLY, MOUNT_READ_WRITE, MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT)) {
MountEntry *found = NULL;
/* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */
for (MountEntry *p = PTR_SUB1(t, ml->mounts); p; p = PTR_SUB1(p, ml->mounts))
if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) {
found = p;
break;
}
/* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */
if (found && found->mode == f->mode) {
log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)",
mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode),
mount_entry_path(found), mount_mode_to_string(found->mode));
mount_entry_done(f);
continue;
}
}
*t = *f;
t++;
}
ml->n_mounts = t - ml->mounts;
}
static void drop_outside_root(MountList *ml, const char *root_directory) {
MountEntry *f, *t;
assert(ml);
/* Nothing to do */
if (!root_directory)
return;
/* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */
for (f = ml->mounts, t = ml->mounts; f < ml->mounts + ml->n_mounts; f++) {
/* ExtensionImages/Directories bases are opened in /run/[user/xyz/]systemd/unit-extensions
* on the host, and a private (invisible to the guest) tmpfs instance is mounted on
* /run/[user/xyz/]systemd/unit-private-tmp as the storage backend of private /tmp and
* /var/tmp. */
if (!IN_SET(f->mode, MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE, MOUNT_EXTENSION_DIRECTORY, MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS) &&
!path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) {
log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f));
mount_entry_done(f);
continue;
}
*t = *f;
t++;
}
ml->n_mounts = t - ml->mounts;
}
static int clone_device_node(const char *node, const char *temporary_mount, bool *make_devnode) {
_cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL;
const char *dn, *bn;
struct stat st;
int r;
assert(node);
assert(path_is_absolute(node));
assert(temporary_mount);
assert(make_devnode);
if (stat(node, &st) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT) {
log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist.", node);
return -ENXIO;
}
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone: %m", node);
}
r = stat_verify_device_node(&st);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Cannot clone device node '%s': %m", node);
dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, node);
/* First, try to create device node properly */
if (*make_devnode) {
mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(node, st.st_mode);
r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev);
mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
if (r >= 0)
goto add_symlink;
if (errno != EPERM)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mknod '%s': %m", node);
/* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */
*make_devnode = false;
}
/* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device node. So create a dummy bind-mount target.
* Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */
r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0);
if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mknod dummy device node for '%s': %m", node);
/* Fallback to bind-mounting: The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard
* properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should either be owned by root:root or
* root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) and should not carry ACLs. */
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, node, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
add_symlink:
bn = path_startswith(node, "/dev/");
if (!bn)
return 0;
/* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */
if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/" DEVNUM_FORMAT_STR,
temporary_mount,
S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block",
DEVNUM_FORMAT_VAL(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
return log_oom_debug();
(void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755);
const char *t = strjoina("../", bn);
if (symlink(t, sl) < 0)
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl);
return 0;
}
static int bind_mount_device_dir(const char *temporary_mount, const char *dir) {
const char *t;
assert(temporary_mount);
assert(dir);
assert(path_is_absolute(dir));
t = strjoina(temporary_mount, dir);
(void) mkdir(t, 0755);
return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dir, t, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
}
static char* settle_runtime_dir(RuntimeScope scope) {
char *runtime_dir;
if (scope != RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER)
return strdup("/run/");
if (asprintf(&runtime_dir, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0)
return NULL;
return runtime_dir;
}
static int create_temporary_mount_point(RuntimeScope scope, char **ret) {
_cleanup_free_ char *runtime_dir = NULL, *temporary_mount = NULL;
assert(ret);
runtime_dir = settle_runtime_dir(scope);
if (!runtime_dir)
return log_oom_debug();
temporary_mount = path_join(runtime_dir, "systemd/namespace-XXXXXX");
if (!temporary_mount)
return log_oom_debug();
if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount))
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount);
*ret = TAKE_PTR(temporary_mount);
return 0;
}
static int mount_private_dev(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceParameters *p) {
static const char devnodes[] =
"/dev/null\0"
"/dev/zero\0"
"/dev/full\0"
"/dev/random\0"
"/dev/urandom\0"
"/dev/tty\0";
_cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *temporary_mount = NULL;
_cleanup_(umount_and_rmdir_and_freep) char *dev = NULL;
bool can_mknod = true;
int r;
assert(m);
assert(p);
r = create_temporary_mount_point(p->runtime_scope, &temporary_mount);
if (r < 0)
return r;
dev = path_join(temporary_mount, "dev");
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
(void) mkdir(dev, 0755);
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_PRIVATE_DEV);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, dev, "/dev", 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev/: %m", dev);
r = bind_mount_device_dir(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts");
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx.
* When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible.
* Thus, in that case make a clone.
* In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */
r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx");
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m");
if (r > 0) {
const char *devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx");
if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx);
} else {
r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
r = bind_mount_device_dir(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm");
if (r < 0)
return r;
FOREACH_STRING(d, "/dev/mqueue", "/dev/hugepages")
(void) bind_mount_device_dir(temporary_mount, d);
/* We assume /run/systemd/journal/ is available if not changing root, which isn't entirely accurate
* but shouldn't matter, as either way the user would get ENOENT when accessing /dev/log */
if ((!p->root_image && !p->root_directory) || p->bind_log_sockets) {
const char *devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log");
if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0)
log_debug_errno(errno,
"Failed to create symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m",
devlog);
}
NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) {
r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
/* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */
if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
return r;
}
r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
if (r < 0)
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount);
/* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be missing when the service is started
* with RootDirectory. This is consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing. */
(void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
/* Unmount everything in old /dev */
r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
if (r < 0)
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
dev = rmdir_and_free(dev); /* Mount is successfully moved, do not umount() */
return 1;
}
static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) {
int r;
assert(m);
/* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the
* service's /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */
(void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m));
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m");
if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */
return 0;
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 1;
}
static int mount_bind_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
int r;
assert(m);
(void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m));
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m");
if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */
return 0;
/* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 1;
}
static int mount_private_apivfs(
const char *fstype,
const char *entry_path,
const char *bind_source,
const char *opts,
RuntimeScope scope) {
_cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *temporary_mount = NULL;
int r;
assert(fstype);
assert(entry_path);
assert(bind_source);
(void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
/* First, check if we have enough privileges to mount a new instance. Note, a new sysfs instance
* cannot be mounted on an already existing mount. Let's use a temporary place. */
r = create_temporary_mount_point(scope, &temporary_mount);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, fstype, temporary_mount, fstype, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) {
/* When we do not have enough privileges to mount a new instance, fall back to use an
* existing mount. */
r = path_is_mount_point(entry_path);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether '%s' is already mounted: %m", entry_path);
if (r > 0)
return 0; /* Use the current mount as is. */
/* We lack permissions to mount a new instance, and it is not already mounted. But we can
* access the host's, so as a final fallback bind-mount it to the destination, as most likely
* we are inside a user manager in an unprivileged user namespace. */
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, bind_source, entry_path, /* fstype = */ NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, /* options = */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 1;
}
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* OK. We have a new mount instance. Let's clear an existing mount and its submounts. */
r = umount_recursive(entry_path, /* flags = */ 0);
if (r < 0)
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", entry_path);
/* Then, move the new mount instance. */
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, temporary_mount, entry_path, /* fstype = */ NULL, MS_MOVE, /* options = */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* We mounted a new instance now. Let's bind mount the children over now. This matters for nspawn
* where a bunch of files are overmounted, in particular the boot id. */
(void) bind_mount_submounts(bind_source, entry_path);
return 1;
}
static int mount_private_sysfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceParameters *p) {
assert(m);
assert(p);
return mount_private_apivfs("sysfs", mount_entry_path(m), "/sys", /* opts = */ NULL, p->runtime_scope);
}
static int mount_private_cgroup2fs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceParameters *p) {
assert(m);
assert(p);
return mount_private_apivfs("cgroup2", mount_entry_path(m), "/sys/fs/cgroup", /* opts = */ NULL, p->runtime_scope);
}
static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceParameters *p) {
_cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
assert(m);
assert(p);
if (p->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
p->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
/* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
* pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
* if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is
* per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
* added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
const char *hpv = p->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ?
"off" :
protect_proc_to_string(p->protect_proc);
/* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in
* 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when
* trying to use hidepid= on systems where it isn't supported. The same applies for subset=.
* fsopen()/fsconfig() was also backported on some distros which allows us to detect
* hidepid=/subset= support in even more scenarios. */
if (mount_option_supported("proc", "hidepid", hpv) > 0) {
opts = strjoin("hidepid=", hpv);
if (!opts)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (p->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID &&
mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid") > 0)
if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid"))
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in
* one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by
* our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything
* mounted on /proc/ first. */
return mount_private_apivfs("proc", mount_entry_path(m), "/proc", opts, p->runtime_scope);
}
static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) {
const char *entry_path, *inner_path;
int r;
assert(m);
entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
inner_path = mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m);
/* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new
* tmpfs */
(void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
(void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, entry_path, inner_path, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path);
return 1;
}
static int mount_run(const MountEntry *m) {
int r;
assert(m);
r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m));
if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /run is already mounted: %m");
if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /run is already a mount point */
return 0;
return mount_tmpfs(m);
}
static int mount_mqueuefs(const MountEntry *m) {
int r;
const char *entry_path;
assert(m);
entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
(void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
(void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "mqueue", entry_path, "mqueue", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 1;
}
static int mount_image(
MountEntry *m,
const char *root_directory,
const ImagePolicy *image_policy) {
_cleanup_(extension_release_data_done) ExtensionReleaseData rdata = {};
_cleanup_free_ char *extension_name = NULL;
ImageClass required_class = _IMAGE_CLASS_INVALID;
int r;
assert(m);
r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
if (m->mode == MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE) {
r = parse_os_release(
empty_to_root(root_directory),
"ID", &rdata.os_release_id,
"ID_LIKE", &rdata.os_release_id_like,
"VERSION_ID", &rdata.os_release_version_id,
image_class_info[IMAGE_SYSEXT].level_env, &rdata.os_release_sysext_level,
image_class_info[IMAGE_CONFEXT].level_env, &rdata.os_release_confext_level,
NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
if (isempty(rdata.os_release_id))
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s'.", empty_to_root(root_directory));
required_class = m->filter_class;
}
r = verity_dissect_and_mount(
/* src_fd= */ -EBADF,
mount_entry_source(m),
mount_entry_path(m),
m->image_options_const,
image_policy,
/* image_filter= */ NULL,
&rdata,
required_class,
&m->verity,
/* ret_image= */ NULL);
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
if (r == -ESTALE && rdata.os_release_id)
return log_error_errno(r, // FIXME: this should not be logged ad LOG_ERR, as it will result in duplicate logging.
"Failed to mount image %s, extension-release metadata does not match the lower layer's: ID=%s ID_LIKE='%s'%s%s%s%s%s%s",
mount_entry_source(m),
rdata.os_release_id,
strempty(rdata.os_release_id_like),
rdata.os_release_version_id ? " VERSION_ID=" : "",
strempty(rdata.os_release_version_id),
rdata.os_release_sysext_level ? image_class_info[IMAGE_SYSEXT].level_env_print : "",
strempty(rdata.os_release_sysext_level),
rdata.os_release_confext_level ? image_class_info[IMAGE_CONFEXT].level_env_print : "",
strempty(rdata.os_release_confext_level));
if (r == -ENOCSI) {
log_debug("Image %s does not match the expected class, ignoring", mount_entry_source(m));
return 0; /* Nothing to do, wrong class */
}
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image %s on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m));
return 1;
}
static int mount_overlay(const MountEntry *m) {
_cleanup_free_ char *options = NULL, *layers = NULL;
int r;
assert(m);
/* Extension hierarchies are optional (e.g.: confext might not have /opt) so check if they actually
* exist in an image before attempting to create an overlay with them, otherwise the mount will
* fail. We can't check before this, as the images will not be mounted until now. */
/* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the top-most directory in the overlay
* comes first in the list. */
STRV_FOREACH_BACKWARDS(o, m->overlay_layers) {
_cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL;
r = is_dir(*o, /* follow= */ false);
if (r <= 0) {
if (r != -ENOENT)
log_debug_errno(r,
"Failed to check whether overlay layer source path '%s' exists, ignoring: %m",
*o);
continue;
}
escaped = shell_escape(*o, ",:");
if (!escaped)
return log_oom_debug();
if (!strextend_with_separator(&layers, ":", escaped))
return log_oom_debug();
}
if (!layers) {
log_debug("None of the overlays specified in '%s' exist at the source, skipping.",
mount_entry_options(m));
return 0; /* Only the root is set? Then there's nothing to overlay */
}
options = strjoin("lowerdir=", layers, ":", mount_entry_path(m)); /* The root goes in last */
if (!options)
return log_oom_debug();
(void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "systemd-extensions", mount_entry_path(m), "overlay", MS_RDONLY, options);
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 1;
}
static int mount_bpffs(const MountEntry *m, int socket_fd) {
int r;
assert(m);
assert(socket_fd >= 0);
_cleanup_close_ int fs_fd = fsopen("bpf", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
if (fs_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to fsopen: %m");
r = send_one_fd(socket_fd, fs_fd, /* flags = */ 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to send bpffs fd to child: %m");
if (read(socket_fd, (uint8_t[1]) {}, 1) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to receive data from child: %m");
_cleanup_close_ int mnt_fd = fsmount(fs_fd, /* flags = */ 0, /* mount_attrs = */ 0);
if (mnt_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to fsmount bpffs: %m");
r = move_mount(mnt_fd, "", AT_FDCWD, mount_entry_path(m), MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to move bpffs mount to %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
return 1;
}
static int follow_symlink(
const char *root_directory,
MountEntry *m) {
_cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
int r;
assert(m);
/* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we
* might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at
* a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the
* end and already have a fully normalized name. */
r = chase(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m));
if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */
return 1;
if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
"Symlink loop on '%s'.",
mount_entry_path(m));
log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s %s %s.",
mount_entry_path(m), glyph(GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), target);
mount_entry_consume_prefix(m, TAKE_PTR(target));
m->n_followed++;
return 0;
}
static int apply_one_mount(
const char *root_directory,
MountEntry *m,
const NamespaceParameters *p) {
_cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
bool rbind = true, make = false;
const char *what;
int r;
/* Return 1 when the mount should be post-processed (remounted r/o, etc.), 0 otherwise. In most
* cases post-processing is the right thing, the typical exception is when the mount is gracefully
* skipped. */
assert(m);
assert(p);
log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
switch (m->mode) {
case MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE: {
_cleanup_free_ char *runtime_dir = NULL;
struct stat target;
/* First, get rid of everything that is below if there
* is anything... Then, overmount it with an
* inaccessible path. */
(void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m",
mount_entry_path(m));
}
/* We don't pass the literal runtime scope through here but one based purely on our UID. This
* means that the root user's --user services will use the host's inaccessible inodes rather
* then root's private ones. This is preferable since it means device nodes that are
* overmounted to make them inaccessible will be overmounted with a device node, rather than
* an AF_UNIX socket inode. */
runtime_dir = settle_runtime_dir(geteuid() == 0 ? RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM : RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER);
if (!runtime_dir)
return log_oom_debug();
r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
"File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed.");
what = inaccessible;
break;
}
case MOUNT_READ_ONLY:
case MOUNT_READ_WRITE:
case MOUNT_READ_WRITE_IMPLICIT:
case MOUNT_EXEC:
case MOUNT_NOEXEC:
r = path_is_mount_point_full(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, /* flags = */ 0);
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m",
mount_entry_path(m));
if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY
* and MS_NOEXEC bits for the mount point if needed. */
return 1;
/* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */
what = mount_entry_path(m);
break;
case MOUNT_EXTENSION_DIRECTORY: {
_cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_id_like = NULL,
*host_os_release_version_id = NULL, *host_os_release_level = NULL,
*extension_name = NULL;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **extension_release = NULL;
ImageClass class = IMAGE_SYSEXT;
r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
r = load_extension_release_pairs(
mount_entry_source(m),
m->filter_class >= 0 ? m->filter_class : IMAGE_SYSEXT,
extension_name,
/* relax_extension_release_check= */ false,
&extension_release);
if (r == -ENOENT) {
if (m->filter_class >= 0)
return 0; /* Nothing to do, wrong class */
r = load_extension_release_pairs(
mount_entry_source(m),
IMAGE_CONFEXT,
extension_name,
/* relax_extension_release_check= */ false,
&extension_release);
if (r >= 0)
class = IMAGE_CONFEXT;
}
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'extension-release' data of extension tree %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
r = parse_os_release(
empty_to_root(root_directory),
"ID", &host_os_release_id,
"ID_LIKE", &host_os_release_id_like,
"VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
image_class_info[class].level_env, &host_os_release_level,
NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s'.", empty_to_root(root_directory));
r = extension_release_validate(
extension_name,
host_os_release_id,
host_os_release_id_like,
host_os_release_version_id,
host_os_release_level,
/* host_extension_scope = */ NULL, /* Leave empty, we need to accept both system and portable */
extension_release,
class);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to compare directory %s extension-release metadata with the root's os-release: %m", extension_name);
if (r == 0)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Directory %s extension-release metadata does not match the root's.", extension_name);
_fallthrough_;
}
case MOUNT_BIND:
rbind = false;
_fallthrough_;
case MOUNT_BIND_RECURSIVE: {
_cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL;
/* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note
* that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as
* root directory to chase() here. */
/* When we create implicit mounts, we might need to create the path ourselves as it is on a
* just-created tmpfs, for example. */
if (m->create_source_dir) {
r = mkdir_p(mount_entry_source(m), m->source_dir_mode);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create source directory %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m), /* flags= */ 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set label of the source directory %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
}
r = chase(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL);
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m));
return 0;
}
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s %s %s.",
mount_entry_source(m), glyph(GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), chased);
free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased);
what = mount_entry_source(m);
make = true;
break;
}
case MOUNT_EMPTY_DIR:
case MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS:
case MOUNT_TMPFS:
return mount_tmpfs(m);
case MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMP:
what = mount_entry_source(m);
make = true;
break;
case MOUNT_PRIVATE_DEV:
return mount_private_dev(m, p);
case MOUNT_BIND_DEV:
return mount_bind_dev(m);
case MOUNT_PRIVATE_SYSFS:
return mount_private_sysfs(m, p);
case MOUNT_BIND_SYSFS:
return mount_bind_sysfs(m);
case MOUNT_PROCFS:
return mount_procfs(m, p);
case MOUNT_PRIVATE_CGROUP2FS:
return mount_private_cgroup2fs(m, p);
case MOUNT_RUN:
return mount_run(m);
case MOUNT_MQUEUEFS:
return mount_mqueuefs(m);
case MOUNT_IMAGE:
return mount_image(m, NULL, p->mount_image_policy);
case MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE:
return mount_image(m, root_directory, p->extension_image_policy);
case MOUNT_OVERLAY:
return mount_overlay(m);
case MOUNT_BPFFS:
return mount_bpffs(m, p->bpffs_socket_fd);
default:
assert_not_reached();
}
assert(what);
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
if (r < 0) {
bool try_again = false;
if (r == -ENOENT && make) {
int q;
/* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create
the destination, then try again. */
(void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
q = make_mount_point_inode_from_path(what, mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
if (q < 0 && q != -EEXIST)
// FIXME: this shouldn't be logged at LOG_WARNING, but be bubbled up, and logged there to avoid duplicate logging
log_warning_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s', ignoring: %m",
mount_entry_path(m));
else
try_again = true;
}
if (try_again)
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m)); // FIXME: this should not be logged here, but be bubbled up, to avoid duplicate logging
}
log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m));
/* Take care of id-mapped mounts */
if (m->idmapped && uid_is_valid(m->idmap_uid) && gid_is_valid(m->idmap_gid)) {
_cleanup_close_ int userns_fd = -EBADF;
_cleanup_free_ char *uid_map = NULL, *gid_map = NULL;
log_debug("Setting an id-mapped mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
/* Do mapping from nobody (in setup_exec_directory()) -> this uid */
if (strextendf(&uid_map, UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", UID_NOBODY, m->idmap_uid) < 0)
return log_oom();
/* Consider StateDirectory=xxx aaa xxx:aaa/222
* To allow for later symlink creation (by root) in create_symlinks_from_tuples(), map root as well. */
if (m->idmap_uid != 0)
if (!strextend(&uid_map, "0 0 1\n"))
return log_oom();
if (strextendf(&gid_map, GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", GID_NOBODY, m->idmap_gid) < 0)
return log_oom();
if (m->idmap_gid != 0)
if (!strextend(&gid_map, "0 0 1\n"))
return log_oom();
userns_fd = userns_acquire(uid_map, gid_map, /* setgroups_deny= */ true);
if (userns_fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(userns_fd, "Failed to allocate user namespace: %m");
/* Drop SUID, add NOEXEC for the mount to avoid root exploits */
r = remount_idmap_fd(STRV_MAKE(mount_entry_path(m)), userns_fd, MOUNT_ATTR_NOSUID | MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC | MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create an id-mapped mount: %m");
log_debug("ID-mapped mount created successfully for %s from " UID_FMT " to " UID_FMT "", mount_entry_path(m), UID_NOBODY, m->idmap_uid);
}
return 1;
}
static bool should_propagate_to_submounts(const MountEntry *m) {
assert(m);
return !IN_SET(m->mode, MOUNT_EMPTY_DIR, MOUNT_TMPFS, MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS);
}
static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
bool submounts;
int r;
assert(m);
assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
if (m->state != MOUNT_APPLIED)
return 0;
if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == MOUNT_PRIVATE_DEV) {
new_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY;
}
if (m->nosuid) {
new_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID;
}
if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
return 0;
/* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's
* nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the
* per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace
* and running Linux <= 4.17. */
submounts = mount_entry_read_only(m) && should_propagate_to_submounts(m);
if (submounts)
r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
else
r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
/* Note that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked
* read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we
* won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
return 0;
}
static int make_noexec(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
bool submounts;
int r;
assert(m);
assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
if (m->state != MOUNT_APPLIED)
return 0;
if (mount_entry_noexec(m)) {
new_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
} else if (mount_entry_exec(m)) {
new_flags &= ~MS_NOEXEC;
flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
}
if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
return 0;
submounts = should_propagate_to_submounts(m);
if (submounts)
r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
else
r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
return 0;
}
static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
bool submounts;
int r;
assert(m);
assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
if (m->state != MOUNT_APPLIED)
return 0;
submounts = should_propagate_to_submounts(m);
if (submounts)
r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, NULL, proc_self_mountinfo);
else
r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, proc_self_mountinfo);
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
return 0;
}
static bool namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceParameters *p) {
assert(p);
/*
* ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
* since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the
* first place...
*/
return p->mount_apivfs ||
p->protect_control_groups != PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_NO ||
p->protect_kernel_tunables ||
p->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
p->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL ||
p->private_bpf != PRIVATE_BPF_NO ||
p->private_pids != PRIVATE_PIDS_NO;
}
/* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all
* mounts:
* - that are implicitly protected by a path that has been rendered inaccessible
* - whose immediate parent requests the same protection mode as the mount itself
* - that are outside of the relevant root directory
* - which are duplicates
*/
static void sort_and_drop_unused_mounts(MountList *ml, const char *root_directory) {
assert(ml);
assert(root_directory);
assert(ml->mounts || ml->n_mounts == 0);
typesafe_qsort(ml->mounts, ml->n_mounts, mount_path_compare);
drop_duplicates(ml);
drop_outside_root(ml, root_directory);
drop_inaccessible(ml);
drop_nop(ml);
}
static int create_symlinks_from_tuples(const char *root, char **strv_symlinks) {
int r;
STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(src, dst, strv_symlinks) {
_cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL;
src_abs = path_join(root, *src);
dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst);
if (!src_abs || !dst_abs)
return -ENOMEM;
r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(
r,
"Failed to create parent directory for symlink '%s': %m",
dst_abs);
r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(
r,
"Failed to create symlink from '%s' to '%s': %m",
src_abs,
dst_abs);
}
return 0;
}
static void mount_entry_path_debug_string(const char *root, MountEntry *m, char **ret_path) {
assert(m);
/* Create a string suitable for debugging logs, stripping for example the local working directory.
* For example, with a BindPaths=/var/bar that does not exist on the host:
*
* Before:
* foo.service: Failed to set up mount namespacing: /run/systemd/unit-root/var/bar: No such file or directory
* After:
* foo.service: Failed to set up mount namespacing: /var/bar: No such file or directory
*
* Note that this is an error path, so no OOM check is done on purpose. */
if (!ret_path)
return;
if (!mount_entry_path(m)) {
*ret_path = NULL;
return;
}
if (root) {
const char *e = startswith(mount_entry_path(m), root);
if (e) {
*ret_path = strdup(e);
return;
}
}
*ret_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
return;
}
static int apply_mounts(
MountList *ml,
const char *root,
const NamespaceParameters *p,
char **reterr_path) {
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL;
int r;
assert(ml);
assert(root);
assert(p);
if (ml->n_mounts == 0) /* Shortcut: nothing to do */
return 0;
/* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of
* /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */
proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re");
if (!proc_self_mountinfo) {
r = -errno;
if (reterr_path)
*reterr_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo");
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to open %s: %m", "/proc/self/mountinfo");
}
/* First round, establish all mounts we need */
for (;;) {
bool again = false;
FOREACH_ARRAY(m, ml->mounts, ml->n_mounts) {
if (m->state != MOUNT_PENDING)
continue;
/* ExtensionImages/Directories are first opened in the propagate directory, not in
* the root_directory. A private (invisible to the guest) tmpfs instance is mounted
* on /run/[user/xyz/]systemd/unit-private-tmp as the storage backend of private
* /tmp and /var/tmp. */
r = follow_symlink(!IN_SET(m->mode, MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE, MOUNT_EXTENSION_DIRECTORY, MOUNT_PRIVATE_TMPFS) ? root : NULL, m);
if (r < 0) {
mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, reterr_path);
return r;
}
if (r == 0) {
/* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might
* point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed
* list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry
* at the new location we might need some other mounts first */
again = true;
break;
}
/* Returns 1 if the mount should be post-processed, 0 otherwise */
r = apply_one_mount(root, m, p);
if (r < 0) {
mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, reterr_path);
return r;
}
m->state = r == 0 ? MOUNT_SKIPPED : MOUNT_APPLIED;
}
if (!again)
break;
sort_and_drop_unused_mounts(ml, root);
}
/* Now that all filesystems have been set up, but before the
* read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs and other symlinks.
* Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already
* exist, which means this will be a no-op. */
r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, p->symlinks);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up symlinks inside mount namespace: %m");
/* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */
deny_list = new(char*, ml->n_mounts+1);
if (!deny_list)
return -ENOMEM;
for (size_t j = 0; j < ml->n_mounts; j++)
deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(ml->mounts+j);
deny_list[ml->n_mounts] = NULL;
/* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */
FOREACH_ARRAY(m, ml->mounts, ml->n_mounts) {
r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
if (r < 0) {
mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, reterr_path);
return r;
}
}
/* Third round, flip the noexec bits with a simplified deny list. */
for (size_t j = 0; j < ml->n_mounts; j++)
if (IN_SET((ml->mounts+j)->mode, MOUNT_EXEC, MOUNT_NOEXEC))
deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(ml->mounts+j);
deny_list[ml->n_mounts] = NULL;
FOREACH_ARRAY(m, ml->mounts, ml->n_mounts) {
r = make_noexec(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
if (r < 0) {
mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, reterr_path);
return r;
}
}
/* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
if (p->mount_nosuid)
FOREACH_ARRAY(m, ml->mounts, ml->n_mounts) {
r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
if (r < 0) {
mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, reterr_path);
return r;
}
}
return 1;
}
static bool root_read_only(
char **read_only_paths,
ProtectSystem protect_system) {
/* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */
if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT)
return true;
if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/"))
return true;
return false;
}
static bool home_read_only(
char * const *read_only_paths,
char * const *inaccessible_paths,
char * const *empty_directories,
const BindMount *bind_mounts,
size_t n_bind_mounts,
const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
ProtectHome protect_home) {
/* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes,
* this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple
* settings. */
if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
return true;
if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") ||
prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") ||
prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home"))
return true;
FOREACH_ARRAY(i, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems)
if (path_equal(i->path, "/home"))
return true;
/* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */
FOREACH_ARRAY(i, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts)
if (path_equal(i->destination, "/home"))
return true;
return false;
}
int setup_namespace(const NamespaceParameters *p, char **reterr_path) {
_cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
_cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL;
_cleanup_(mount_list_done) MountList ml = {};
_cleanup_close_ int userns_fd = -EBADF;
bool require_prefix = false;
const char *root;
DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags =
DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT |
DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP |
DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK |
DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK |
DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT |
DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS |
DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES |
DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES |
DISSECT_IMAGE_ALLOW_USERSPACE_VERITY;
int r;
assert(p);
/* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes
* we configure take effect */
BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000);
bool setup_propagate = !isempty(p->propagate_dir) && !isempty(p->incoming_dir);
unsigned long mount_propagation_flag = p->mount_propagation_flag != 0 ? p->mount_propagation_flag : MS_SHARED;
if (p->root_image) {
/* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
if (root_read_only(p->read_only_paths,
p->protect_system) &&
home_read_only(p->read_only_paths, p->inaccessible_paths, p->empty_directories,
p->bind_mounts, p->n_bind_mounts, p->temporary_filesystems, p->n_temporary_filesystems,
p->protect_home) &&
strv_isempty(p->read_write_paths))
dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, p->verity && p->verity->data_path);
if (p->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM) {
/* In system mode we mount directly */
r = loop_device_make_by_path(
p->root_image,
FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
/* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX,
FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
LOCK_SH,
&loop_device);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m");
r = dissect_loop_device(
loop_device,
p->verity,
p->root_image_options,
p->root_image_policy,
/* image_filter= */ NULL,
dissect_image_flags,
&dissected_image);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
dissected_image,
loop_device->fd,
p->verity);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = dissected_image_guess_verity_roothash(
dissected_image,
p->verity);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = dissected_image_decrypt(
dissected_image,
NULL,
p->verity,
dissect_image_flags);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
} else {
userns_fd = namespace_open_by_type(NAMESPACE_USER);
if (userns_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(userns_fd, "Failed to open our own user namespace: %m");
r = mountfsd_mount_image(
p->root_image,
userns_fd,
p->root_image_policy,
dissect_image_flags,
&dissected_image);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
}
if (p->root_directory)
root = p->root_directory;
else {
/* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like
* when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure
* we create it if it doesn't already exist. */
(void) mkdir_p_label("/run/systemd", 0755);
/* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating directly
* in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being potentially obscured
* my other mounts we already applied. We use the same mount point for all images, which is
* safe, since they all live in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each
* other. (Note: this directory is also created by PID 1 early on, we create it here for
* similar reasons as /run/systemd/ first.) */
root = "/run/systemd/mount-rootfs";
(void) mkdir_label(root, 0555);
require_prefix = true;
}
if (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories)) {
/* Hierarchy population needs to be done for sysext and confext extension images */
r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies, "SYSTEMD_SYSEXT_AND_CONFEXT_HIERARCHIES");
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
r = append_access_mounts(&ml, p->read_write_paths, MOUNT_READ_WRITE, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_access_mounts(&ml, p->read_only_paths, MOUNT_READ_ONLY, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_access_mounts(&ml, p->inaccessible_paths, MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_access_mounts(&ml, p->exec_paths, MOUNT_EXEC, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_access_mounts(&ml, p->no_exec_paths, MOUNT_NOEXEC, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&ml, p->empty_directories);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_bind_mounts(&ml, p->bind_mounts, p->n_bind_mounts);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&ml, p->temporary_filesystems, p->n_temporary_filesystems);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_private_tmp(&ml, p);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_mount_images(&ml, p->mount_images, p->n_mount_images);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_extensions(&ml, root, p->private_namespace_dir, hierarchies, p->extension_images, p->n_extension_images, p->extension_directories);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (p->private_dev) {
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(&ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/dev",
.mode = MOUNT_PRIVATE_DEV,
.flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS,
};
}
/* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the protective
mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have failed gracefully, so
let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */
bool ignore_protect_proc = p->ignore_protect_paths || p->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID;
if (p->protect_kernel_tunables) {
r = append_static_mounts(&ml,
protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table),
ignore_protect_proc);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_static_mounts(&ml,
protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table),
p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
if (p->protect_kernel_modules) {
r = append_static_mounts(&ml,
protect_kernel_modules_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
if (p->protect_kernel_logs) {
r = append_static_mounts(&ml,
protect_kernel_logs_proc_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table),
ignore_protect_proc);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_static_mounts(&ml,
protect_kernel_logs_dev_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table),
p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
r = append_protect_control_groups(&ml, p->protect_control_groups, false);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_protect_home(&ml, p->protect_home, p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_protect_system(&ml, p->protect_system, false);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_private_bpf(&ml, p->private_bpf, p->protect_kernel_tunables, /* ignore_protect = */ false, p);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(p)) {
r = append_static_mounts(&ml,
apivfs_table,
ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
/* Only mount /proc/sys/kernel/hostname and domainname read-only if ProtectHostname=yes. Otherwise,
* ProtectHostname=no allows changing hostname for the host, and ProtectHostname=private allows
* changing the hostname in the unit's UTS namespace. Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then
* neither of the two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by the mount option. */
if (p->protect_hostname == PROTECT_HOSTNAME_YES) {
r = append_static_mounts(
&ml,
protect_hostname_yes_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_hostname_yes_table),
ignore_protect_proc);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
if (p->private_network) {
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(&ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/sys",
.mode = MOUNT_PRIVATE_SYSFS,
};
}
if (p->private_ipc) {
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(&ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/dev/mqueue",
.mode = MOUNT_MQUEUEFS,
.flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME,
};
}
if (p->creds_path) {
/* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
* everything else. */
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(&ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/run/credentials",
.mode = MOUNT_TMPFS,
.read_only = true,
.options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
.flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
};
me = mount_list_extend(&ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = p->creds_path,
.mode = MOUNT_BIND,
.read_only = true,
.source_const = p->creds_path,
.ignore = true,
};
} else {
/* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole credentials tree
* inaccessible wholesale. */
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(&ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/run/credentials",
.mode = MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE,
.ignore = true,
};
}
if (p->log_namespace) {
_cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", p->log_namespace);
if (!q)
return log_oom_debug();
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(&ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/run/systemd/journal",
.mode = MOUNT_BIND_RECURSIVE,
.read_only = true,
.source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q),
};
} else if (p->bind_log_sockets) {
r = append_bind_mounts(&ml, bind_log_sockets_table, ELEMENTSOF(bind_log_sockets_table));
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
/* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */
if (setup_propagate) {
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(&ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.source_const = p->propagate_dir,
.path_const = p->incoming_dir,
.mode = MOUNT_BIND,
.read_only = true,
};
}
if (p->notify_socket_path) {
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(&ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = p->notify_socket_path,
.source_const = p->host_notify_socket,
.mode = MOUNT_BIND,
.read_only = true,
};
}
if (p->host_os_release_stage) {
MountEntry *me = mount_list_extend(&ml);
if (!me)
return log_oom_debug();
*me = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/run/host/.os-release-stage/",
.source_const = p->host_os_release_stage,
.mode = MOUNT_BIND,
.read_only = true,
.ignore = true, /* Live copy, don't hard-fail if it goes missing */
};
}
/* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */
r = prefix_where_needed(&ml, root);
if (r < 0)
return r;
sort_and_drop_unused_mounts(&ml, root);
/* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m");
if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ||
ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
/* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter
* in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then
* propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case
* (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */
return -ENOANO;
return r;
}
/* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */
if (setup_propagate)
(void) mkdir_p(p->propagate_dir, 0600);
if (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories)) {
/* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the
* mounts to create, so have the parent ready */
char *extension_dir = strjoina(p->private_namespace_dir, "/unit-extensions");
(void) mkdir_p(extension_dir, 0600);
}
/* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
* shows up in the parent */
if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m");
if (p->root_image) {
/* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
r = dissected_image_mount(
dissected_image,
root,
/* uid_shift= */ UID_INVALID,
/* uid_range= */ UID_INVALID,
userns_fd,
dissect_image_flags);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m");
/* Now release the block device lock, so that udevd is free to call BLKRRPART on the device
* if it likes. */
if (loop_device) {
r = loop_device_flock(loop_device, LOCK_UN);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to release lock on loopback block device: %m");
}
r = dissected_image_relinquish(dissected_image);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish dissected image: %m");
} else if (p->root_directory) {
/* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
r = path_is_mount_point_full(root, /* root = */ NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root);
if (r == 0) {
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
} else {
/* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
/* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
if (p->root_image || p->root_directory)
(void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
/* Now make the magic happen */
r = apply_mounts(&ml, root, p, reterr_path);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
if (r == -EINVAL && p->root_directory) {
/* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user
* namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace,
* MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than
* EPERM). Attempt to bind-mount it over itself (like we do above if it's not already a
* mount point) and try again. */
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
}
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m");
/* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not reestablish propagation from our side to
* the host, since what's disconnected is disconnected. */
if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_propagation_flag | MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m");
/* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only supported for
* non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */
if (setup_propagate && mount(NULL, p->incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", p->incoming_dir);
return 0;
}
void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) {
assert(b || n == 0);
FOREACH_ARRAY(i, b, n) {
free(i->source);
free(i->destination);
}
free(b);
}
int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
assert(b);
assert(n);
assert(item);
s = strdup(item->source);
if (!s)
return -ENOMEM;
d = strdup(item->destination);
if (!d)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(*b, *n + 1))
return -ENOMEM;
(*b)[(*n)++] = (BindMount) {
.source = TAKE_PTR(s),
.destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
.read_only = item->read_only,
.nodev = item->nodev,
.nosuid = item->nosuid,
.noexec = item->noexec,
.recursive = item->recursive,
.ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
};
return 0;
}
MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) {
assert(n);
assert(m || *n == 0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < *n; i++) {
free(m[i].source);
free(m[i].destination);
mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options);
}
free(m);
*n = 0;
return NULL;
}
int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
_cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL;
assert(m);
assert(n);
assert(item);
s = strdup(item->source);
if (!s)
return -ENOMEM;
if (item->destination) {
d = strdup(item->destination);
if (!d)
return -ENOMEM;
}
LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) {
_cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o = NULL;
o = new(MountOptions, 1);
if (!o)
return -ENOMEM;
*o = (MountOptions) {
.partition_designator = i->partition_designator,
.options = strdup(i->options),
};
if (!o->options)
return -ENOMEM;
LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o));
}
if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(*m, *n + 1))
return -ENOMEM;
(*m)[(*n)++] = (MountImage) {
.source = TAKE_PTR(s),
.destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
.mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options),
.ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
.type = item->type,
};
return 0;
}
void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) {
assert(t || n == 0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(t[i].path);
free(t[i].options);
}
free(t);
}
int temporary_filesystem_add(
TemporaryFileSystem **t,
size_t *n,
const char *path,
const char *options) {
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL;
assert(t);
assert(n);
assert(path);
p = strdup(path);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!isempty(options)) {
o = strdup(options);
if (!o)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(*t, *n + 1))
return -ENOMEM;
(*t)[(*n)++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) {
.path = TAKE_PTR(p),
.options = TAKE_PTR(o),
};
return 0;
}
static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) {
_cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
int r;
/* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */
r = access(prefix, F_OK);
if (r >= 0)
return 0;
if (errno != ENOENT)
return -errno;
WITH_UMASK(000)
r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* umask will corrupt this access mode, but that doesn't matter, we need to call chmod() anyway for
* the suid bit, below. */
fd = open_mkdir(t, O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, 0777);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
r = RET_NERRNO(fchmod(fd, 01777));
if (r < 0) {
(void) rmdir(t);
return r;
}
r = RET_NERRNO(rename(t, prefix));
if (r < 0) {
(void) rmdir(t);
return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */
}
return 0;
}
static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) {
_cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL;
sd_id128_t boot_id;
bool rw = true;
int r;
assert(id);
assert(prefix);
assert(path);
/* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a
* reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */
r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id);
if (r < 0)
return r;
x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", SD_ID128_TO_STRING(boot_id), "-", id, "-XXXXXX");
if (!x)
return -ENOMEM;
r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix);
if (r < 0)
return r;
WITH_UMASK(0077)
if (!mkdtemp(x)) {
if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno))
rw = false;
else
return -errno;
}
if (rw) {
y = strjoin(x, "/tmp");
if (!y)
return -ENOMEM;
WITH_UMASK(0000)
if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0)
return -errno;
r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, y, prefix, 0);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (tmp_path)
*tmp_path = TAKE_PTR(y);
} else {
/* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being
* read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real
* file system. */
WITH_UMASK(0000)
r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
*path = TAKE_PTR(x);
return 0;
}
char* namespace_cleanup_tmpdir(char *p) {
PROTECT_ERRNO;
if (!streq_ptr(p, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY))
(void) rmdir(p);
return mfree(p);
}
int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) {
_cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL;
_cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL;
char *b;
int r;
assert(id);
assert(tmp_dir);
assert(var_tmp_dir);
r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */
*tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a);
*var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b);
return 0;
}
int setup_shareable_ns(int ns_storage_socket[static 2], unsigned long nsflag) {
_cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF;
const char *ns_name, *ns_path;
int r;
assert(ns_storage_socket);
assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
ns_name = ASSERT_PTR(namespace_single_flag_to_string(nsflag));
/* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our namespace reference fd. Whatever process
* runs this first shall create a new namespace, all others should just join it. To serialize that we
* use a file lock on the socket pair.
*
* It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */
r = posix_lock(ns_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX);
if (r < 0)
return r;
CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(ns_storage_socket[0]);
ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (ns >= 0) {
/* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */
r = RET_NERRNO(setns(ns, nsflag));
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
if (ns != -EAGAIN)
return ns;
/* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */
if (unshare(nsflag) < 0)
return -errno;
if (nsflag == CLONE_NEWNET)
(void) loopback_setup();
ns_path = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", ns_name);
ns = open(ns_path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (ns < 0)
return -errno;
r = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 1;
}
int open_shareable_ns_path(int ns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path, unsigned long nsflag) {
_cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF;
NamespaceType type;
int r;
assert(ns_storage_socket);
assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
assert(path);
/* If the storage socket doesn't contain a ns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in
* it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_shareable_ns() which will
* allocate a new anonymous ns if needed. */
type = clone_flag_to_namespace_type(nsflag);
assert(type >= 0);
r = posix_lock(ns_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX);
if (r < 0)
return r;
CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(ns_storage_socket[0]);
ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (ns >= 0)
return 0;
if (ns != -EAGAIN)
return ns;
/* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */
ns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (ns < 0)
return -errno;
r = fd_is_namespace(ns, type);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -EINVAL;
r = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 1;
}
static int is_extension_overlay(const char *path, int fd) {
_cleanup_free_ char *source = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int dfd = -EBADF;
int r;
assert(path);
if (fd < 0) {
r = chase(path, /* root= */ NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH|CHASE_MUST_BE_DIRECTORY, /* ret_path= */ NULL, &dfd);
if (r < 0)
return r;
fd = dfd;
}
r = is_mount_point_at(fd, /* filename= */ NULL, /* flags= */ 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether '%s' is a mount point: %m", path);
if (r == 0)
return 0;
r = fd_is_fs_type(fd, OVERLAYFS_SUPER_MAGIC);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to check if %s is an overlayfs: %m", path);
if (r == 0)
return 0;
/* Check the 'source' field of the mount on mount_path */
r = path_get_mount_info_at(fd, /* path= */ NULL, /* ret_fstype= */ NULL, /* ret_options= */ NULL, &source);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to get mount info for %s: %m", path);
if (!streq_ptr(source, "systemd-extensions"))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int unpeel_get_fd(const char *mount_path, int *ret_fd) {
_cleanup_close_pair_ int pipe_fds[2] = EBADF_PAIR;
_cleanup_close_ int fs_fd = -EBADF;
pid_t pid;
int r;
assert(mount_path);
assert(ret_fd);
r = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, pipe_fds);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create socket pair: %m");
/* Clone mount namespace here to unpeel without affecting live process */
r = safe_fork("(sd-ns-unpeel)", FORK_DEATHSIG_SIGTERM|FORK_LOG|FORK_WAIT|FORK_NEW_MOUNTNS|FORK_MOUNTNS_SLAVE, &pid);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
_cleanup_close_ int dir_fd = -EBADF;
pipe_fds[0] = safe_close(pipe_fds[0]);
/* Opportunistically unmount any overlay at this path */
r = is_extension_overlay(mount_path, /* fd= */ -EBADF);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether '%s' is an extension overlay: %m", mount_path);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (r > 0) {
r = umount_recursive(mount_path, MNT_DETACH);
if (r < 0)
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
if (r == 0) /* no umounts done, possible if a previous reload deleted all extensions */
log_debug("No overlay layer unmountable from %s", mount_path);
}
/* Now that /mount_path is exposed, get an FD for it and pass back */
dir_fd = open_tree(-EBADF, mount_path, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW|OPEN_TREE_CLONE);
if (dir_fd < 0) {
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to clone mount %s: %m", mount_path);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
r = fd_is_fs_type(dir_fd, OVERLAYFS_SUPER_MAGIC);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether '%s' is an overlay after opening mount tree: %m", mount_path);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (r > 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "'%s' is still an overlay after opening mount tree: %m", mount_path);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
r = send_one_fd(pipe_fds[1], dir_fd, 0);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to send mount fd: %m");
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
pipe_fds[1] = safe_close(pipe_fds[1]);
r = receive_one_fd(pipe_fds[0], 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to receive mount fd: %m");
fs_fd = r;
r = fd_is_fs_type(fs_fd, OVERLAYFS_SUPER_MAGIC);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine if unpeeled directory refers to overlayfs: %m");
if (r > 0)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE), "Unpeeled mount is still an overlayfs, something is weird, refusing.");
*ret_fd = TAKE_FD(fs_fd);
return 0;
}
/* In target namespace, unmounts an existing overlayfs at mount_path (if one exists), grabs FD from the
* underlying directory, and sets up a new overlayfs mount. Coordinates with parent process over pair_fd:
* 1. Creates and sends new overlay fs fd to parent
* 2. Fake-unmounts overlay at mount_path to obtain underlying directory fd to build new overlay
* 3. Waits for parent to configure layers
* 4. Performs final mount at mount_path
*
* This is used by refresh_extensions_in_namespace() to peel back any existing overlays and reapply them.
*/
static int unpeel_mount_and_setup_overlay(int pair_fd, const char *mount_path) {
_cleanup_close_ int dir_unpeeled_fd = -EBADF, overlay_fs_fd = -EBADF, mount_fd = -EBADF;
int r;
assert(pair_fd >= 0);
assert(mount_path);
/* Create new OverlayFS and send to parent */
overlay_fs_fd = fsopen("overlay", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
if (overlay_fs_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create overlay fs for %s: %m", mount_path);
r = send_one_fd(pair_fd, overlay_fs_fd, /* flags= */ 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to send overlay fs fd to parent: %m");
/* Unpeel in cloned mount namespace to get underlying directory fd */
r = unpeel_get_fd(mount_path, &dir_unpeeled_fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unpeel mount %s: %m", mount_path);
/* Send the fd to the parent */
r = send_one_fd(pair_fd, dir_unpeeled_fd, /* flags= */ 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to send %s fd to parent: %m", mount_path);
/* Wait for parent to signal overlay configuration completion */
log_debug("Waiting for configured overlay fs for %s", mount_path);
r = receive_one_fd(pair_fd, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to receive configured overlay: %m");
/* Create the mount */
mount_fd = fsmount(overlay_fs_fd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, /* flags= */ 0);
if (mount_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create overlay mount: %m");
/* Move mount to final location */
r = mount_exchange_graceful(mount_fd, mount_path, /* mount_beneath= */ true);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to move overlay to %s: %m", mount_path);
return 0;
}
static int refresh_grandchild_proc(
const PidRef *target,
MountList *ml,
const char *overlay_prefix,
int pidns_fd,
int mntns_fd,
int root_fd,
int pipe_fd) {
int r;
assert(pidref_is_set(target));
assert(ml);
assert(overlay_prefix);
assert(pidns_fd >= 0);
assert(mntns_fd >= 0);
assert(root_fd >= 0);
assert(pipe_fd >= 0);
r = namespace_enter(pidns_fd, mntns_fd, /* netns_fd= */ -EBADF, /* userns_fd= */ -EBADF, root_fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to enter namespace: %m");
/* Handle each overlay mount path */
FOREACH_ARRAY(m, ml->mounts, ml->n_mounts) {
if (m->mode != MOUNT_OVERLAY)
continue;
/* Need an absolute path under the child namespace, rather than the root's */
_cleanup_free_ char *mount_path = NULL;
mount_path = path_join("/",
path_startswith(mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m), overlay_prefix) ?:
mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m));
if (!mount_path)
return log_oom_debug();
/* If there are no extensions mounted for this overlay layer, instead of setting everything
* up, the correct behavior is to unmount the existing overlay in the target namespace to
* expose the original files. */
if (strv_isempty(m->overlay_layers)) {
r = is_extension_overlay(mount_path, /* fd= */ -EBADF);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether '%s' is an extension overlay: %m", mount_path);
if (r == 0)
continue;
log_debug("No extensions for %s, undoing existing mount", mount_path);
(void) umount_recursive(mount_path, MNT_DETACH);
continue;
}
r = unpeel_mount_and_setup_overlay(pipe_fd, mount_path);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to setup overlay mount for %s: %m", mount_path);
}
return 0;
}
static int handle_mount_from_grandchild(
MountEntry *m,
const char *overlay_prefix,
int **fd_layers,
size_t *n_fd_layers,
int pipe_fd) {
_cleanup_free_ char *layers = NULL, *options = NULL, *hierarchy_path_moved_mount = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int hierarchy_path_fd = -EBADF, overlay_fs_fd = -EBADF;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **new_layers = NULL;
int r;
assert(m);
assert(overlay_prefix);
assert(fd_layers);
assert(n_fd_layers);
assert(pipe_fd >= 0);
if (m->mode != MOUNT_OVERLAY)
return 0;
const char *mount_path = path_startswith(mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m), overlay_prefix);
if (!mount_path)
mount_path = mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m);
/* If there are no extensions mounted for this overlay layer, we only need to
* unmount the existing overlay (this is handled in the grandchild process) and
* would skip the usual cooperative processing here.
*/
if (strv_isempty(m->overlay_layers)) {
log_debug("No layers for %s, skip setting up overlay", mount_path);
return 0;
}
/* Receive the fds from grandchild */
overlay_fs_fd = receive_one_fd(pipe_fd, 0);
if (overlay_fs_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(overlay_fs_fd, "Failed to receive overlay fs fd from grandchild: %m");
hierarchy_path_fd = receive_one_fd(pipe_fd, 0);
if (hierarchy_path_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(hierarchy_path_fd, "Failed to receive fd from grandchild for %s: %m", mount_path);
/* move_mount so that it is visible on our end. */
hierarchy_path_moved_mount = path_join(overlay_prefix, mount_path);
if (!hierarchy_path_moved_mount)
return log_oom_debug();
(void) mkdir_p_label(hierarchy_path_moved_mount, 0555);
r = move_mount(hierarchy_path_fd, "", AT_FDCWD, hierarchy_path_moved_mount, MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to move mount for %s: %m", mount_path);
/* Turn all overlay layer directories into FD-based references */
if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(*fd_layers, *n_fd_layers + strv_length(m->overlay_layers)))
return log_oom_debug();
STRV_FOREACH(ol, m->overlay_layers) {
_cleanup_close_ int tree_fd = -EBADF;
tree_fd = open_tree(-EBADF, *ol, /* flags= */ 0);
if (tree_fd < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open_tree overlay layer '%s': %m", *ol);
r = strv_extend(&new_layers, FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(tree_fd));
if (r < 0)
return log_oom_debug();
*fd_layers[(*n_fd_layers)++] = TAKE_FD(tree_fd);
}
m->overlay_layers = strv_free(m->overlay_layers);
m->overlay_layers = TAKE_PTR(new_layers);
layers = strv_join(m->overlay_layers, ":");
if (!layers)
return log_oom_debug();
/* Append the underlying hierarchy path as the last lowerdir */
options = strjoin(layers, ":", FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(hierarchy_path_fd));
if (!options)
return log_oom_debug();
if (fsconfig(overlay_fs_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "lowerdir", options, 0) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to set lowerdir=%s: %m", options);
if (fsconfig(overlay_fs_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "source", "systemd-extensions", 0) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to set source=systemd-extensions: %m");
/* Create the superblock */
if (fsconfig(overlay_fs_fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0)
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create overlay superblock: %m");
/* Signal completion to grandchild */
r = send_one_fd(pipe_fd, overlay_fs_fd, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to signal overlay configuration complete for %s: %m", mount_path);
return 0;
}
static int refresh_apply_and_prune(const NamespaceParameters *p, MountList *ml) {
int r;
assert(p);
assert(ml);
/* Open all extensions on the host, drop all sysexts since they won't have /etc/. The list of
* overlays also need to be updated, so that if it's empty after a confext has been removed, the
* child process can correctly undo the overlay in the target namespace, rather than attempting to
* mount an empty overlay which the kernel does not allow, so this pruning has to be done here and
* not later (nor earlier, as we don't know if an image is a confext until this point). */
MountEntry *f, *t;
for (f = ml->mounts, t = ml->mounts; f < ml->mounts + ml->n_mounts; f++) {
if (IN_SET(f->mode, MOUNT_EXTENSION_DIRECTORY, MOUNT_EXTENSION_IMAGE)) {
f->filter_class = IMAGE_CONFEXT;
r = apply_one_mount("/", f, p);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Nothing happened? Then it is not a confext, prune it from the lists */
if (r == 0) {
FOREACH_ARRAY(m, ml->mounts, ml->n_mounts) {
if (m->mode != MOUNT_OVERLAY)
continue;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **pruned = NULL;
STRV_FOREACH(ol, m->overlay_layers)
if (!path_startswith(*ol, mount_entry_path(f))) {
r = strv_extend(&pruned, *ol);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom_debug();
}
strv_free(m->overlay_layers);
m->overlay_layers = TAKE_PTR(pruned);
}
mount_entry_done(f);
continue;
}
}
*t = *f;
t++;
}
ml->n_mounts = t - ml->mounts;
return 0;
}
int refresh_extensions_in_namespace(
const PidRef *target,
const char *hierarchy_env,
const NamespaceParameters *p) {
_cleanup_close_ int mntns_fd = -EBADF, root_fd = -EBADF, pidns_fd = -EBADF;
const char *overlay_prefix = "/run/systemd/mount-rootfs";
_cleanup_(mount_list_done) MountList ml = {};
_cleanup_free_ char *extension_dir = NULL;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL;
int r;
assert(pidref_is_set(target));
assert(hierarchy_env);
assert(p);
log_debug("Refreshing extensions in-namespace for hierarchy '%s'", hierarchy_env);
r = pidref_namespace_open(target, &pidns_fd, &mntns_fd, /* ret_netns_fd= */ NULL, /* ret_userns_fd= */ NULL, &root_fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to open namespace: %m");
r = is_our_namespace(mntns_fd, NAMESPACE_MOUNT);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to check if target namespace is separate: %m");
if (r > 0)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Target namespace is not separate, cannot reload extensions");
extension_dir = path_join(p->private_namespace_dir, "unit-extensions");
if (!extension_dir)
return log_oom_debug();
r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies, hierarchy_env);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = append_extensions(
&ml,
overlay_prefix,
p->private_namespace_dir,
hierarchies,
p->extension_images,
p->n_extension_images,
p->extension_directories);
if (r < 0)
return r;
sort_and_drop_unused_mounts(&ml, overlay_prefix);
if (ml.n_mounts == 0)
return 0;
/**
* There are three main steps:
* 1. In child, set up the extension images and directories in a slave mountns, so that we have
* access to their FDs
* 2. Fork into a grandchild, which will enter the target namespace and attempt to "unpeel" the
* overlays to obtain FDs the underlying directories, over which we will reapply the overlays
* 3. In the child again, receive the FDs and reapply the overlays
*/
r = safe_fork("(sd-ns-refresh-exts)",
FORK_DEATHSIG_SIGTERM|FORK_WAIT|FORK_NEW_MOUNTNS|FORK_MOUNTNS_SLAVE,
NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
/* Child (host namespace) */
_cleanup_close_pair_ int pair[2] = EBADF_PAIR;
_cleanup_(sigkill_waitp) pid_t grandchild_pid = 0;
(void) mkdir_p_label(overlay_prefix, 0555);
r = refresh_apply_and_prune(p, &ml);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to apply extensions for refreshing: %m");
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* Create a grandchild process to handle the unmounting and reopening of hierarchy */
r = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, pair);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create socket pair: %m");
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
r = safe_fork("(sd-ns-refresh-exts-grandchild)",
FORK_LOG|FORK_DEATHSIG_SIGKILL,
&grandchild_pid);
if (r < 0)
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
if (r == 0) {
/* Grandchild (target service namespace) */
pair[0] = safe_close(pair[0]);
r = refresh_grandchild_proc(target, &ml, overlay_prefix, pidns_fd, mntns_fd, root_fd, pair[1]);
if (r < 0) {
pair[1] = safe_close(pair[1]);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
pair[1] = safe_close(pair[1]);
/* Until kernel 6.15, the FDs to the individual layers used to set up the OverlayFS via
* lowerdir=/proc/self/fd/X need to remain open until the OverlayFS mount is _attached_
* (as opposed to merely created) to its mount point, hence we need to ensure these FDs
* stay open until the grandchild has attached the mount and exited. */
// TODO: once the kernel baseline is >= 6.15, move the FD array into the helper function
// and close them immediately
int *fd_layers = NULL;
size_t n_fd_layers = 0;
CLEANUP_ARRAY(fd_layers, n_fd_layers, close_many_and_free);
FOREACH_ARRAY(m, ml.mounts, ml.n_mounts) {
r = handle_mount_from_grandchild(m, overlay_prefix, &fd_layers, &n_fd_layers, pair[0]);
if (r < 0)
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
r = wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-ns-refresh-exts-grandchild)", TAKE_PID(grandchild_pid), 0);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to wait for target namespace process to finish: %m");
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (r != EXIT_SUCCESS) {
log_debug("Target namespace fork did not succeed");
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
return 0;
}
static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = {
[PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no",
[PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes",
[PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
[PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES);
static const char *const protect_hostname_table[_PROTECT_HOSTNAME_MAX] = {
[PROTECT_HOSTNAME_NO] = "no",
[PROTECT_HOSTNAME_YES] = "yes",
[PROTECT_HOSTNAME_PRIVATE] = "private",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_hostname, ProtectHostname, PROTECT_HOSTNAME_YES);
static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = {
[PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no",
[PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes",
[PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full",
[PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES);
static const char *const protect_control_groups_table[_PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_MAX] = {
[PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_NO] = "no",
[PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_YES] = "yes",
[PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_PRIVATE] = "private",
[PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_STRICT] = "strict",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_control_groups, ProtectControlGroups, PROTECT_CONTROL_GROUPS_YES);
static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = {
[PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default",
[PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess",
[PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible",
[PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc);
static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = {
[PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all",
[PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);
static const char* const private_bpf_table[_PRIVATE_BPF_MAX] = {
[PRIVATE_BPF_NO] = "no",
[PRIVATE_BPF_YES] = "yes",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(private_bpf, PrivateBPF, PRIVATE_BPF_YES);
#include "bpf-delegate-configs.inc"
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(bpf_delegate_cmd, uint64_t);
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(bpf_delegate_map_type, uint64_t);
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(bpf_delegate_prog_type, uint64_t);
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(bpf_delegate_attach_type, uint64_t);
char* bpf_delegate_to_string(uint64_t u, const char * (*parser)(uint64_t) _const_ ) {
assert(parser);
if (u == UINT64_MAX)
return strdup("any");
_cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL;
BIT_FOREACH(i, u) {
const char *s = parser(i);
if (s) {
if (!strextend_with_separator(&buf, ",", s))
return NULL;
} else {
if (strextendf_with_separator(&buf, ",", "%d", i) < 0)
return NULL;
}
}
return TAKE_PTR(buf) ?: strdup("");
}
int bpf_delegate_from_string(const char *s, uint64_t *ret, uint64_t (*parser)(const char *)) {
int r;
assert(s);
assert(ret);
assert(parser);
if (streq(s, "any")) {
*ret = UINT64_MAX;
return 0;
}
uint64_t mask = 0;
for (;;) {
_cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL;
r = extract_first_word(&s, &word, ",", /* flags = */ 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse delegate options \"%s\": %m", s);
if (r == 0)
break;
r = parser(word);
if (r < 0)
log_warning_errno(r, "Unknown BPF delegate option, ignoring: %s", word);
else
mask |= UINT64_C(1) << r;
}
*ret = mask;
return 0;
}
static const char* const private_tmp_table[_PRIVATE_TMP_MAX] = {
[PRIVATE_TMP_NO] = "no",
[PRIVATE_TMP_CONNECTED] = "connected",
[PRIVATE_TMP_DISCONNECTED] = "disconnected",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(private_tmp, PrivateTmp, PRIVATE_TMP_CONNECTED);
static const char* const private_users_table[_PRIVATE_USERS_MAX] = {
[PRIVATE_USERS_NO] = "no",
[PRIVATE_USERS_SELF] = "self",
[PRIVATE_USERS_IDENTITY] = "identity",
[PRIVATE_USERS_FULL] = "full",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(private_users, PrivateUsers, PRIVATE_USERS_SELF);
static const char* const private_pids_table[_PRIVATE_PIDS_MAX] = {
[PRIVATE_PIDS_NO] = "no",
[PRIVATE_PIDS_YES] = "yes",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(private_pids, PrivatePIDs, PRIVATE_PIDS_YES);