mirror of
https://github.com/morgan9e/systemd
synced 2026-04-14 16:37:19 +09:00
This adds a new "foreign" value to --private-users-ownership= which is a lot like "map", but maps from the host's foreign UID range rather than from the host's 0. (This has nothing much to do with making unprivileged directory-based containers work, it's just very handy that we can run privileged contains with such a mapping too, with an easy switch)
196 lines
7.7 KiB
C
196 lines
7.7 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
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#pragma once
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#include <mntent.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "alloc-util.h"
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#include "dissect-image.h"
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#include "errno-util.h"
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#include "macro.h"
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#include "pidref.h"
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typedef struct SubMount {
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char *path;
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int mount_fd;
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} SubMount;
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void sub_mount_array_free(SubMount *s, size_t n);
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int get_sub_mounts(const char *prefix, SubMount **ret_mounts, size_t *ret_n_mounts);
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int repeat_unmount(const char *path, int flags);
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int umount_recursive_full(const char *target, int flags, char **keep);
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static inline int umount_recursive(const char *target, int flags) {
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return umount_recursive_full(target, flags, NULL);
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}
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int bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(const char *prefix, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo);
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static inline int bind_remount_recursive(const char *prefix, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask, char **deny_list) {
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return bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(prefix, new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, NULL);
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}
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int bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(const char *path, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo);
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int bind_remount_one(const char *path, unsigned long new_flags, unsigned long flags_mask);
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int mount_switch_root_full(const char *path, unsigned long mount_propagation_flag, bool force_ms_move);
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static inline int mount_switch_root(const char *path, unsigned long mount_propagation_flag) {
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return mount_switch_root_full(path, mount_propagation_flag, false);
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}
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DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL(FILE*, endmntent, NULL);
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#define _cleanup_endmntent_ _cleanup_(endmntentp)
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int mount_verbose_full(
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int error_log_level,
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const char *what,
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const char *where,
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const char *type,
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unsigned long flags,
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const char *options,
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bool follow_symlink);
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static inline int mount_follow_verbose(
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int error_log_level,
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const char *what,
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const char *where,
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const char *type,
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unsigned long flags,
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const char *options) {
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return mount_verbose_full(error_log_level, what, where, type, flags, options, true);
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}
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static inline int mount_nofollow_verbose(
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int error_log_level,
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const char *what,
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const char *where,
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const char *type,
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unsigned long flags,
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const char *options) {
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return mount_verbose_full(error_log_level, what, where, type, flags, options, false);
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}
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int umount_verbose(
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int error_log_level,
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const char *where,
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int flags);
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int umountat_detach_verbose(
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int error_log_level,
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int fd,
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const char *where);
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int mount_option_mangle(
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const char *options,
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unsigned long mount_flags,
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unsigned long *ret_mount_flags,
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char **ret_remaining_options);
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int mode_to_inaccessible_node(const char *runtime_dir, mode_t mode, char **dest);
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int mount_flags_to_string(unsigned long flags, char **ret);
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/* Useful for usage with _cleanup_(), unmounts, removes a directory and frees the pointer */
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static inline char* umount_and_rmdir_and_free(char *p) {
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if (!p)
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return NULL;
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PROTECT_ERRNO;
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(void) umount_recursive(p, 0);
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(void) rmdir(p);
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return mfree(p);
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}
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DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(char*, umount_and_rmdir_and_free);
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static inline char* umount_and_free(char *p) {
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if (!p)
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return NULL;
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PROTECT_ERRNO;
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(void) umount_recursive(p, 0);
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return mfree(p);
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}
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DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(char*, umount_and_free);
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char* umount_and_unlink_and_free(char *p);
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DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(char*, umount_and_unlink_and_free);
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int mount_exchange_graceful(int fsmount_fd, const char *dest, bool mount_beneath);
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typedef enum MountInNamespaceFlags {
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MOUNT_IN_NAMESPACE_READ_ONLY = 1 << 0,
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MOUNT_IN_NAMESPACE_MAKE_FILE_OR_DIRECTORY = 1 << 1,
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MOUNT_IN_NAMESPACE_IS_IMAGE = 1 << 2,
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} MountInNamespaceFlags;
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int bind_mount_in_namespace(
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const PidRef *target,
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const char *propagate_path,
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const char *incoming_path,
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const char *src,
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const char *dest,
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MountInNamespaceFlags flags);
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int mount_image_in_namespace(
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const PidRef *target,
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const char *propagate_path,
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const char *incoming_path,
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const char *src,
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const char *dest,
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MountInNamespaceFlags flags,
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const MountOptions *options,
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const ImagePolicy *image_policy);
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int make_mount_point(const char *path);
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int fd_make_mount_point(int fd);
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typedef enum RemountIdmapping {
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REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_NONE,
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/* Include a mapping from UID_MAPPED_ROOT (i.e. UID 2^31-2) on the backing fs to UID 0 on the
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* uidmapped fs. This is useful to ensure that the host root user can safely add inodes to the
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* uidmapped fs (which otherwise wouldn't work as the host root user is not defined on the uidmapped
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* mount and any attempts to create inodes will then be refused with EOVERFLOW). The idea is that
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* these inodes are quickly re-chown()ed to more suitable UIDs/GIDs. Any code that intends to be able
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* to add inodes to file systems mapped this way should set this flag, but given it comes with
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* certain security implications defaults to off, and requires explicit opt-in. */
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REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_HOST_ROOT,
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/* Much like REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_HOST_ROOT, but the source mapping is not from 0…65535 but from the
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* foreign UID range. */
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REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_FOREIGN_WITH_HOST_ROOT,
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/* Define a mapping from root user within the container to the owner of the bind mounted directory.
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* This ensures no root-owned files will be written in a bind-mounted directory owned by a different
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* user. No other users are mapped. */
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REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_HOST_OWNER,
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/* Define a mapping from bind-target owner within the container to the host owner of the bind mounted
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* directory. No other users are mapped. */
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REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_HOST_OWNER_TO_TARGET_OWNER,
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_REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_MAX,
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_REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_INVALID = -EINVAL,
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} RemountIdmapping;
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int make_userns(uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range, uid_t host_owner, uid_t dest_owner, RemountIdmapping idmapping);
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int remount_idmap_fd(char **p, int userns_fd, uint64_t extra_mount_attr_set);
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int remount_idmap(char **p, uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range, uid_t host_owner, uid_t dest_owner, RemountIdmapping idmapping);
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int bind_mount_submounts(
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const char *source,
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const char *target);
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/* Creates a mount point (not parents) based on the source path or stat - ie, a file or a directory */
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int make_mount_point_inode_from_stat(const struct stat *st, const char *dest, mode_t mode);
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int make_mount_point_inode_from_path(const char *source, const char *dest, mode_t mode);
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int trigger_automount_at(int dir_fd, const char *path);
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unsigned long credentials_fs_mount_flags(bool ro);
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int mount_credentials_fs(const char *path, size_t size, bool ro);
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int make_fsmount(int error_log_level, const char *what, const char *type, unsigned long flags, const char *options, int userns_fd);
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int path_is_network_fs_harder_at(int dir_fd, const char *path);
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static inline int path_is_network_fs_harder(const char *path) {
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return path_is_network_fs_harder_at(AT_FDCWD, path);
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}
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