Files
systemd/src/bootctl/bootctl-random-seed.c
Lennart Poettering bbeeea4362 bootctl: replace --no-variables by --variables=BOOL
I think the current behaviour of not doing EFI variables when we are run
in a container makes a ton of sense, but in some cases it's useful to
do EFI var setup even when a set of namespaces is set up for us, for
example to recover a hosed installation from a rescue disk.

While we are at it, let's remove some duplicate checks, and
systematically output information why we skip various operations.

Fixes: #36174 #35005
2025-04-16 13:39:12 +02:00

231 lines
8.7 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "bootctl.h"
#include "bootctl-random-seed.h"
#include "bootctl-util.h"
#include "efi-api.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "find-esp.h"
#include "fs-util.h"
#include "glyph-util.h"
#include "io-util.h"
#include "mkdir.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "random-util.h"
#include "sha256.h"
#include "tmpfile-util.h"
#include "umask-util.h"
static int random_seed_verify_permissions(int fd, mode_t expected_type) {
_cleanup_free_ char *full_path = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r;
assert(fd >= 0);
r = fd_get_path(fd, &full_path);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Unable to determine full path of random seed fd: %m");
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Unable to stat %s: %m", full_path);
if (((st.st_mode ^ expected_type) & S_IFMT) != 0)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF),
"Unexpected inode type when validating random seed access mode on %s: %m", full_path);
if ((st.st_mode & 0007) == 0) /* All world bits are off? Then all is good */
return 0;
if (S_ISREG(expected_type))
log_error("%s%sRandom seed file '%s' is world accessible, which is a security hole!%s%s",
optional_glyph(GLYPH_WARNING_SIGN), optional_glyph(GLYPH_SPACE),
full_path,
optional_glyph(GLYPH_SPACE), optional_glyph(GLYPH_WARNING_SIGN));
else
log_error("%s%s Mount point '%s' which backs the random seed file is world accessible, which is a security hole! %s%s",
optional_glyph(GLYPH_WARNING_SIGN), optional_glyph(GLYPH_SPACE),
full_path,
optional_glyph(GLYPH_SPACE), optional_glyph(GLYPH_WARNING_SIGN));
return 1;
}
static int set_system_token(void) {
uint8_t buffer[RANDOM_EFI_SEED_SIZE];
size_t token_size;
int r;
if (!touch_variables())
return 0;
r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_WRITE_SYSTEM_TOKEN");
if (r < 0) {
if (r != -ENXIO)
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_WRITE_SYSTEM_TOKEN, ignoring.");
} else if (r == 0) {
log_notice("Not writing system token, because $SYSTEMD_WRITE_SYSTEM_TOKEN is set to false.");
return 0;
}
r = efi_get_variable(EFI_LOADER_VARIABLE_STR("LoaderSystemToken"), NULL, NULL, &token_size);
if (r == -ENODATA)
log_debug_errno(r, "LoaderSystemToken EFI variable is invalid (too short?), replacing.");
else if (r < 0) {
if (r != -ENOENT)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to test system token validity: %m");
} else {
if (token_size >= sizeof(buffer)) {
/* Let's avoid writes if we can, and initialize this only once. */
log_debug("System token already written, not updating.");
return 0;
}
log_debug("Existing system token size (%zu) does not match our expectations (%zu), replacing.", token_size, sizeof(buffer));
}
r = crypto_random_bytes(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire random seed: %m");
/* Let's write this variable with an umask in effect, so that unprivileged users can't see the token
* and possibly get identification information or too much insight into the kernel's entropy pool
* state. */
WITH_UMASK(0077) {
r = efi_set_variable(EFI_LOADER_VARIABLE_STR("LoaderSystemToken"), buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (r < 0) {
if (!arg_graceful)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write 'LoaderSystemToken' EFI variable: %m");
if (r == -EINVAL)
log_notice_errno(r, "Unable to write 'LoaderSystemToken' EFI variable (firmware problem?), ignoring: %m");
else
log_notice_errno(r, "Unable to write 'LoaderSystemToken' EFI variable, ignoring: %m");
} else
log_info("Successfully initialized system token in EFI variable with %zu bytes.", sizeof(buffer));
}
return 0;
}
int install_random_seed(const char *esp) {
_cleanup_close_ int esp_fd = -EBADF, loader_dir_fd = -EBADF, fd = -EBADF;
_cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL;
uint8_t buffer[RANDOM_EFI_SEED_SIZE];
struct sha256_ctx hash_state;
bool refreshed, warned = false;
int r;
assert(esp);
assert_cc(RANDOM_EFI_SEED_SIZE == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
esp_fd = open(esp, O_DIRECTORY|O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (esp_fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open ESP directory '%s': %m", esp);
(void) random_seed_verify_permissions(esp_fd, S_IFDIR);
loader_dir_fd = open_mkdir_at(esp_fd, "loader", O_DIRECTORY|O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW, 0775);
if (loader_dir_fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(loader_dir_fd, "Failed to open loader directory '%s/loader': %m", esp);
r = crypto_random_bytes(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire random seed: %m");
sha256_init_ctx(&hash_state);
sha256_process_bytes_and_size(buffer, sizeof(buffer), &hash_state);
fd = openat(loader_dir_fd, "random-seed", O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0) {
if (errno != ENOENT)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open old random seed file: %m");
sha256_process_bytes(&(const ssize_t) { 0 }, sizeof(ssize_t), &hash_state);
refreshed = false;
} else {
ssize_t n;
warned = random_seed_verify_permissions(fd, S_IFREG) > 0;
/* Hash the old seed in so that we never regress in entropy. */
n = read(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (n < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to read old random seed file: %m");
sha256_process_bytes_and_size(buffer, n, &hash_state);
fd = safe_close(fd);
refreshed = n > 0;
}
sha256_finish_ctx(&hash_state, buffer);
if (tempfn_random("random-seed", "bootctl", &tmp) < 0)
return log_oom();
fd = openat(loader_dir_fd, tmp, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOCTTY|O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
if (fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(fd, "Failed to open random seed file for writing: %m");
if (!warned) /* only warn once per seed file */
(void) random_seed_verify_permissions(fd, S_IFREG);
r = loop_write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write random seed file: %m");
goto fail;
}
if (fsync(fd) < 0 || fsync(loader_dir_fd) < 0) {
r = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to sync random seed file: %m");
goto fail;
}
if (renameat(loader_dir_fd, tmp, loader_dir_fd, "random-seed") < 0) {
r = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to move random seed file into place: %m");
goto fail;
}
tmp = mfree(tmp);
if (syncfs(fd) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to sync ESP file system: %m");
log_info("Random seed file %s/loader/random-seed successfully %s (%zu bytes).", esp, refreshed ? "refreshed" : "written", sizeof(buffer));
return set_system_token();
fail:
assert(tmp);
(void) unlinkat(loader_dir_fd, tmp, 0);
return r;
}
int verb_random_seed(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
int r;
r = find_esp_and_warn(arg_root, arg_esp_path, false, &arg_esp_path, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (r == -ENOKEY) {
/* find_esp_and_warn() doesn't warn about ENOKEY, so let's do that on our own */
if (!arg_graceful)
return log_error_errno(r, "Unable to find ESP.");
log_notice("No ESP found, not initializing random seed.");
return 0;
}
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = install_random_seed(arg_esp_path);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 0;
}