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systemd/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c

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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include <getopt.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "sd-device.h"
#include "sd-event.h"
#include "sd-json.h"
#include "sd-messages.h"
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "argv-util.h"
#include "ask-password-api.h"
#include "build.h"
#include "cryptsetup-fido2.h"
#include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h"
#include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h"
#include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h"
#include "cryptsetup-util.h"
#include "efi-api.h"
#include "efi-loader.h"
#include "efivars.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "extract-word.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "fs-util.h"
#include "fstab-util.h"
#include "hexdecoct.h"
#include "json-util.h"
#include "libfido2-util.h"
#include "libmount-util.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "main-func.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
#include "mount-util.h"
#include "nulstr-util.h"
#include "parse-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "pkcs11-util.h"
#include "pretty-print.h"
#include "random-util.h"
#include "string-table.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
#include "time-util.h"
#include "tpm2-pcr.h"
#include "tpm2-util.h"
#include "verbs.h"
/* internal helper */
#define ANY_LUKS "LUKS"
/* as in src/cryptsetup.h */
#define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512U
#define CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE 4096U
typedef enum PassphraseType {
PASSPHRASE_NONE,
PASSPHRASE_REGULAR = 1 << 0,
PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY = 1 << 1,
PASSPHRASE_BOTH = PASSPHRASE_REGULAR|PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY,
_PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX,
_PASSPHRASE_TYPE_INVALID = -1,
} PassphraseType;
typedef enum TokenType {
TOKEN_TPM2,
TOKEN_FIDO2,
TOKEN_PKCS11,
_TOKEN_TYPE_MAX,
_TOKEN_TYPE_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} TokenType;
static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT, CRYPT_BITLK or CRYPT_PLAIN */
static char *arg_cipher = NULL;
static unsigned arg_key_size = 0;
static unsigned arg_sector_size = CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE;
static int arg_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT;
static unsigned arg_keyfile_size = 0;
static uint64_t arg_keyfile_offset = 0;
static bool arg_keyfile_erase = false;
static bool arg_try_empty_password = false;
static char *arg_hash = NULL;
static char *arg_header = NULL;
static unsigned arg_tries = 3;
static bool arg_readonly = false;
static bool arg_verify = false;
static bool arg_password_cache_set = false; /* Not the actual argument value, just an indicator that some value is set */
static AskPasswordFlags arg_ask_password_flags = ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED | ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE;
static bool arg_discards = false;
static bool arg_same_cpu_crypt = false;
static bool arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = false;
static bool arg_no_read_workqueue = false;
static bool arg_no_write_workqueue = false;
static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false;
static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false;
static bool arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = false;
static uint32_t arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim = 0;
static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL;
static uint64_t arg_offset = 0;
static uint64_t arg_skip = 0;
static usec_t arg_timeout = USEC_INFINITY;
static char *arg_pkcs11_uri = NULL;
static bool arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false;
static char *arg_fido2_device = NULL;
static bool arg_fido2_device_auto = false;
static void *arg_fido2_cid = NULL;
static size_t arg_fido2_cid_size = 0;
static char *arg_fido2_rp_id = NULL;
/* For now and for compatibility, if the user explicitly configured FIDO2 support and we do
* not read FIDO2 metadata off the LUKS2 header, default to the systemd 248 logic, where we
* use PIN + UP when needed, and do not configure UV at all. */
static Fido2EnrollFlags arg_fido2_manual_flags = FIDO2ENROLL_PIN_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UP_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UV_OMIT;
static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL; /* These and the following fields are about locking an encrypted volume to the local TPM */
static bool arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX;
static char *arg_tpm2_signature = NULL;
static bool arg_tpm2_pin = false;
static char *arg_tpm2_pcrlock = NULL;
static usec_t arg_token_timeout_usec = 30*USEC_PER_SEC;
static unsigned arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = UINT_MAX; /* This and the following field is about measuring the unlocked volume key to the local TPM */
static char **arg_tpm2_measure_banks = NULL;
static char *arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr = NULL;
static char *arg_link_keyring = NULL;
static char *arg_link_key_type = NULL;
static char *arg_link_key_description = NULL;
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_header, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, strv_freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_uri, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_device, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_cid, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_rp_id, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_signature, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_measure_banks, strv_freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_pcrlock, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_keyring, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_key_type, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_key_description, freep);
static const char* const passphrase_type_table[_PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX] = {
[PASSPHRASE_REGULAR] = "passphrase",
[PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY] = "recovery key",
[PASSPHRASE_BOTH] = "passphrase or recovery key",
};
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(passphrase_type, PassphraseType);
static const char* const token_type_table[_TOKEN_TYPE_MAX] = {
[TOKEN_TPM2] = "tpm2",
[TOKEN_FIDO2] = "fido2",
[TOKEN_PKCS11] = "pkcs11",
};
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(token_type, TokenType);
/* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't:
check=
checkargs=
noearly
loud
quiet
keyscript=
initramfs
*/
static int parse_one_option(const char *option) {
const char *val;
int r;
assert(option);
/* Handled outside of this tool */
if (STR_IN_SET(option, "noauto", "auto", "nofail", "fail", "_netdev", "keyfile-timeout"))
return 0;
if (startswith(option, "keyfile-timeout="))
return 0;
if ((val = startswith(option, "cipher="))) {
r = free_and_strdup(&arg_cipher, val);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "size="))) {
r = safe_atou(val, &arg_key_size);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
if (arg_key_size % 8) {
log_warning("size= not a multiple of 8, ignoring.");
return 0;
}
arg_key_size /= 8;
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "sector-size="))) {
r = safe_atou(val, &arg_sector_size);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
if (arg_sector_size % 2) {
log_warning("sector-size= not a multiple of 2, ignoring.");
return 0;
}
if (arg_sector_size < CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE || arg_sector_size > CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE)
log_warning("sector-size= is outside of %u and %u, ignoring.", CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "key-slot=")) ||
(val = startswith(option, "keyslot="))) {
arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
r = safe_atoi(val, &arg_key_slot);
if (r < 0)
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tcrypt-keyfile="))) {
arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
if (path_is_absolute(val)) {
if (strv_extend(&arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, val) < 0)
return log_oom();
} else
log_warning("Key file path \"%s\" is not absolute, ignoring.", val);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-size="))) {
r = safe_atou(val, &arg_keyfile_size);
if (r < 0)
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-offset="))) {
r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_keyfile_offset);
if (r < 0)
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-erase="))) {
r = parse_boolean(val);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
arg_keyfile_erase = r;
} else if (streq(option, "keyfile-erase"))
arg_keyfile_erase = true;
else if ((val = startswith(option, "hash="))) {
r = free_and_strdup(&arg_hash, val);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "header="))) {
if (!arg_type || !STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT))
arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
if (!path_is_absolute(val))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Header path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val);
if (arg_header)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Duplicate header= option, refusing.");
arg_header = strdup(val);
if (!arg_header)
return log_oom();
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tries="))) {
r = safe_atou(val, &arg_tries);
if (r < 0)
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
} else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "readonly", "read-only"))
arg_readonly = true;
else if (streq(option, "verify"))
arg_verify = true;
else if ((val = startswith(option, "password-echo="))) {
if (streq(val, "masked"))
arg_ask_password_flags &= ~(ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO|ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT);
else {
r = parse_boolean(val);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Invalid password-echo= option \"%s\", ignoring.", val);
return 0;
}
SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO, r);
SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT, !r);
}
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "password-cache="))) {
arg_password_cache_set = true;
if (streq(val, "read-only")) {
arg_ask_password_flags |= ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED;
arg_ask_password_flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE;
} else {
r = parse_boolean(val);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Invalid password-cache= option \"%s\", ignoring.", val);
return 0;
}
SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED|ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE, r);
}
} else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "allow-discards", "discard"))
arg_discards = true;
else if (streq(option, "same-cpu-crypt"))
arg_same_cpu_crypt = true;
else if (streq(option, "submit-from-crypt-cpus"))
arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = true;
else if (streq(option, "no-read-workqueue"))
arg_no_read_workqueue = true;
else if (streq(option, "no-write-workqueue"))
arg_no_write_workqueue = true;
else if (streq(option, "luks"))
arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
/* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */
#ifdef CRYPT_BITLK
else if (streq(option, "bitlk"))
arg_type = CRYPT_BITLK;
#endif
else if (streq(option, "tcrypt"))
arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-hidden", "tcrypthidden")) {
arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
arg_tcrypt_hidden = true;
} else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) {
arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
arg_tcrypt_system = true;
} else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-veracrypt", "veracrypt")) {
arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = true;
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "veracrypt-pim="))) {
r = safe_atou32(val, &arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
} else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp") ||
startswith(option, "tmp="))
arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN;
else if ((val = startswith(option, "timeout="))) {
r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_timeout);
if (r < 0)
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "offset="))) {
r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_offset);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "skip="))) {
r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_skip);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "pkcs11-uri="))) {
if (streq(val, "auto")) {
arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri);
arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = true;
} else {
if (!pkcs11_uri_valid(val))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "pkcs11-uri= parameter expects a PKCS#11 URI, refusing.");
r = free_and_strdup(&arg_pkcs11_uri, val);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false;
}
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-device="))) {
if (streq(val, "auto")) {
arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device);
arg_fido2_device_auto = true;
} else {
r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_device, val);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
arg_fido2_device_auto = false;
}
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-cid="))) {
if (streq(val, "auto"))
arg_fido2_cid = mfree(arg_fido2_cid);
else {
_cleanup_free_ void *cid = NULL;
size_t cid_size;
r = unbase64mem(val, &cid, &cid_size);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to decode FIDO2 CID data: %m");
free(arg_fido2_cid);
arg_fido2_cid = TAKE_PTR(cid);
arg_fido2_cid_size = cid_size;
}
/* Turn on FIDO2 as side-effect, if not turned on yet. */
if (!arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto)
arg_fido2_device_auto = true;
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-rp="))) {
r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_rp_id, val);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-pin="))) {
r = parse_boolean(val);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
arg_fido2_manual_flags &= ~FIDO2ENROLL_PIN_IF_NEEDED;
SET_FLAG(arg_fido2_manual_flags, FIDO2ENROLL_PIN, r);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-up="))) {
r = parse_boolean(val);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
arg_fido2_manual_flags &= ~FIDO2ENROLL_UP_IF_NEEDED;
SET_FLAG(arg_fido2_manual_flags, FIDO2ENROLL_UP, r);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-uv="))) {
r = parse_boolean(val);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
arg_fido2_manual_flags &= ~FIDO2ENROLL_UV_OMIT;
SET_FLAG(arg_fido2_manual_flags, FIDO2ENROLL_UV, r);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-device="))) {
if (streq(val, "auto")) {
arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device);
arg_tpm2_device_auto = true;
} else {
r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_device, val);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
}
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrs="))) {
r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(val, &arg_tpm2_pcr_mask);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-signature="))) {
if (!path_is_absolute(val))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"TPM2 signature path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val);
r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_signature, val);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pin="))) {
r = parse_boolean(val);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
arg_tpm2_pin = r;
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrlock="))) {
if (!path_is_absolute(val))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"TPM2 pcrlock policy path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val);
r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_pcrlock, val);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-pcr="))) {
unsigned pcr;
r = safe_atou(val, &pcr);
if (r < 0) {
r = parse_boolean(val);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
pcr = r ? TPM2_PCR_SYSTEM_IDENTITY : UINT_MAX;
} else if (!TPM2_PCR_INDEX_VALID(pcr)) {
log_warning("Selected TPM index for measurement %u outside of allowed range 0…%u, ignoring.", pcr, TPM2_PCRS_MAX-1);
return 0;
}
arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = pcr;
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-bank="))) {
#if HAVE_OPENSSL
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
l = strv_split(val, ":");
if (!l)
return log_oom();
STRV_FOREACH(i, l) {
const EVP_MD *implementation;
implementation = EVP_get_digestbyname(*i);
if (!implementation)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown bank '%s', refusing.", val);
if (strv_extend(&arg_tpm2_measure_banks, EVP_MD_name(implementation)) < 0)
return log_oom();
}
#else
log_error("Build lacks OpenSSL support, cannot measure to PCR banks, ignoring: %s", option);
#endif
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-keyslot-nvpcr="))) {
if (isempty(val)) {
arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr = mfree(arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr);
return 0;
}
if (!tpm2_nvpcr_name_is_valid(val)) {
log_warning("Invalid NvPCR name, ignoring: %s", option);
return 0;
}
if (free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, val) < 0)
return log_oom();
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "try-empty-password="))) {
r = parse_boolean(val);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
arg_try_empty_password = r;
} else if (streq(option, "try-empty-password"))
arg_try_empty_password = true;
else if ((val = startswith(option, "headless="))) {
r = parse_boolean(val);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
return 0;
}
SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS, r);
} else if (streq(option, "headless"))
arg_ask_password_flags |= ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS;
else if ((val = startswith(option, "token-timeout="))) {
r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_token_timeout_usec);
if (r < 0)
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "link-volume-key="))) {
#if HAVE_CRYPT_SET_KEYRING_TO_LINK
_cleanup_free_ char *keyring = NULL, *key_type = NULL, *key_description = NULL;
const char *sep;
/* Stick with cryptsetup --link-vk-to-keyring format
* <keyring_description>::%<key_type>:<key_description>,
* where %<key_type> is optional and defaults to 'user'.
*/
sep = strstr(val, "::");
if (!sep)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to parse link-volume-key= option value: %s", val);
/* cryptsetup (cli) supports <keyring_description> passed in various formats:
* - well-known keyrings prefixed with '@' (@u user, @s session, etc)
* - text descriptions prefixed with "%:" or "%keyring:".
* - text description with no prefix.
* - numeric keyring id (ignored in current patch set). */
keyring = strndup(val, sep - val);
if (!keyring)
return log_oom();
/* add type prefix if missing (crypt_set_keyring_to_link() expects it) */
if (!IN_SET(*keyring, '@', '%'))
if (!strprepend(&keyring, "%:"))
return log_oom();
sep += 2;
/* %<key_type> is optional (and defaults to 'user') */
if (*sep == '%') {
/* must be separated by colon */
const char *c = strchr(sep, ':');
if (!c)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to parse link-volume-key= option value: %s", val);
key_type = strndup(sep + 1, c - sep - 1);
if (!key_type)
return log_oom();
sep = c + 1;
}
key_description = strdup(sep);
if (!key_description)
return log_oom();
free_and_replace(arg_link_keyring, keyring);
free_and_replace(arg_link_key_type, key_type);
free_and_replace(arg_link_key_description, key_description);
#else
log_error("Build lacks libcryptsetup support for linking volume keys in user specified kernel keyrings upon device activation, ignoring: %s", option);
#endif
} else if (!streq(option, "x-initrd.attach"))
log_warning("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option);
return 0;
}
static int parse_crypt_config(const char *options) {
assert(options);
for (;;) {
_cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL;
int r;
r = extract_first_word(&options, &word, ",", EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS | EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse options: %m");
if (r == 0)
break;
r = parse_one_option(word);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
/* sanity-check options */
if (arg_type && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
if (arg_offset != 0)
log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
if (arg_skip != 0)
log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
}
if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) {
/* If password-cache was not configured explicitly, default to no cache for PKCS#11 */
if (!arg_password_cache_set)
arg_ask_password_flags &= ~(ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED|ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE);
/* This prevents future backward-compatibility issues if we decide to allow caching for PKCS#11 */
if (FLAGS_SET(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Password cache is not supported for PKCS#11 security tokens.");
}
return 0;
}
static char* disk_description(const char *path) {
static const char name_fields[] =
"DM_NAME\0"
"ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0"
"ID_MODEL\0";
_cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *device = NULL;
const char *name;
struct stat st;
assert(path);
if (stat(path, &st) < 0)
return NULL;
if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
return NULL;
if (sd_device_new_from_stat_rdev(&device, &st) < 0)
return NULL;
if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, "ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME", &name) >= 0) {
_cleanup_free_ char *unescaped = NULL;
ssize_t l;
/* ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME uses \x style escaping, using libblkid's blkid_encode_string(). Let's
* reverse this here to make the string more human friendly in case people embed spaces or
* other weird stuff. */
l = cunescape(name, UNESCAPE_RELAX, &unescaped);
if (l < 0) {
log_debug_errno(l, "Failed to unescape ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME, skipping device: %m");
return NULL;
}
if (!isempty(unescaped) && !string_has_cc(unescaped, NULL))
return TAKE_PTR(unescaped);
}
/* These need no unescaping. */
NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields)
if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name) >= 0 &&
!isempty(name))
return strdup(name);
return NULL;
}
static char* disk_mount_point(const char *label) {
_cleanup_(mnt_free_tablep) struct libmnt_table *table = NULL;
_cleanup_(mnt_free_iterp) struct libmnt_iter *iter = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL;
int r;
/* Yeah, we don't support native systemd unit files here for now */
assert(label);
device = strjoin("/dev/mapper/", label);
if (!device)
return NULL;
r = libmount_parse_fstab(&table, &iter);
if (r < 0)
return NULL;
for (;;) {
struct libmnt_fs *fs;
r = sym_mnt_table_next_fs(table, iter, &fs);
if (r != 0)
return NULL;
if (path_equal(sym_mnt_fs_get_source(fs), device)) {
const char *target = sym_mnt_fs_get_target(fs);
if (target)
return strdup(target);
}
}
}
static char *friendly_disk_name(const char *src, const char *vol) {
_cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *mount_point = NULL;
char *name_buffer = NULL;
int r;
assert(src);
assert(vol);
description = disk_description(src);
mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol);
/* If the description string is simply the volume name, then let's not show this twice */
if (description && streq(vol, description))
description = mfree(description);
if (mount_point && description)
r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point);
else if (mount_point)
r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point);
else if (description)
r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol);
else
return strdup(vol);
if (r < 0)
return NULL;
return name_buffer;
}
static PassphraseType check_registered_passwords(struct crypt_device *cd) {
_cleanup_free_ bool *slots = NULL;
int slot_max;
PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE;
assert(cd);
if (!streq_ptr(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2)) {
log_debug("%s: not a LUKS2 device, only passphrases are supported", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
return PASSPHRASE_REGULAR;
}
/* Search all used slots */
assert_se((slot_max = crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2)) > 0);
slots = new(bool, slot_max);
if (!slots)
return log_oom();
for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++)
slots[slot] = IN_SET(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, slot), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST);
/* Iterate all LUKS2 tokens and keep track of all their slots */
for (int token = 0; token < sym_crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token++) {
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *v = NULL;
const char *type;
sd_json_variant *w, *z;
int tk;
tk = cryptsetup_get_token_as_json(cd, token, NULL, &v);
if (IN_SET(tk, -ENOENT, -EINVAL))
continue;
if (tk < 0) {
log_warning_errno(tk, "Failed to read JSON token data, ignoring: %m");
continue;
}
w = sd_json_variant_by_key(v, "type");
if (!w || !sd_json_variant_is_string(w)) {
log_warning("Token JSON data lacks type field, ignoring.");
continue;
}
type = sd_json_variant_string(w);
if (STR_IN_SET(type, "systemd-recovery", "systemd-pkcs11", "systemd-fido2", "systemd-tpm2")) {
/* At least exists one recovery key */
if (streq(type, "systemd-recovery"))
passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY;
w = sd_json_variant_by_key(v, "keyslots");
if (!w || !sd_json_variant_is_array(w)) {
log_warning("Token JSON data lacks keyslots field, ignoring.");
continue;
}
JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(z, w) {
unsigned u;
int at;
if (!sd_json_variant_is_string(z)) {
log_warning("Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an array of strings, ignoring.");
continue;
}
at = safe_atou(sd_json_variant_string(z), &u);
if (at < 0) {
log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an integer formatted as string, ignoring.");
continue;
}
if (u >= (unsigned) slot_max) {
log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field exceeds the maximum value allowed, ignoring.");
continue;
}
slots[u] = false;
}
}
}
/* Check if any of the slots is not referenced by systemd tokens */
for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++)
if (slots[slot]) {
passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_REGULAR;
break;
}
/* All the slots are referenced by systemd tokens, so if a recovery key is not enrolled,
* we will not be able to enter a passphrase. */
return passphrase_type;
}
static int get_password(
const char *vol,
const char *src,
usec_t until,
bool ignore_cached,
PassphraseType passphrase_type,
char ***ret) {
_cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *text = NULL, *disk_path = NULL, *id = NULL;
_cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags;
int r;
assert(vol);
assert(src);
assert(ret);
if (FLAGS_SET(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "Password querying disabled via 'headless' option.");
friendly = friendly_disk_name(src, vol);
if (!friendly)
return log_oom();
if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s:", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0)
return log_oom();
disk_path = cescape(src);
if (!disk_path)
return log_oom();
id = strjoin("cryptsetup:", disk_path);
if (!id)
return log_oom();
AskPasswordRequest req = {
.tty_fd = -EBADF,
.message = text,
.icon = "drive-harddisk",
.id = id,
.keyring = "cryptsetup",
.credential = "cryptsetup.passphrase",
.until = until,
.hup_fd = -EBADF,
};
if (ignore_cached)
flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED;
r = ask_password_auto(&req, flags, &passwords);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m");
if (arg_verify) {
_cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL;
assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1);
text = mfree(text);
if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s (verification):", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0)
return log_oom();
free(id);
id = strjoin("cryptsetup-verification:", disk_path);
if (!id)
return log_oom();
req.message = text;
req.id = id;
r = ask_password_auto(&req, flags, &passwords2);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m");
assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1);
if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0]))
return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"Passwords did not match, retrying.");
}
strv_uniq(passwords);
STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
char *c;
if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size)
continue;
/* Pad password if necessary */
c = new(char, arg_key_size);
if (!c)
return log_oom();
strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size);
erase_and_free(*p);
*p = TAKE_PTR(c);
}
*ret = TAKE_PTR(passwords);
return 0;
}
static int measure_volume_key(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const void *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size) {
int r;
assert(cd);
assert(name);
assert(volume_key);
assert(volume_key_size > 0);
if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) {
log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated.");
return 0;
}
r = efi_measured_uki(LOG_WARNING);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
log_debug("Kernel stub did not measure kernel image into the expected PCR, skipping userspace volume key measurement, too.");
return 0;
}
#if HAVE_TPM2
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL;
r = tpm2_context_new_or_warn(arg_tpm2_device, &c);
if (r < 0)
return r;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
if (strv_isempty(arg_tpm2_measure_banks)) {
r = tpm2_get_good_pcr_banks_strv(c, UINT32_C(1) << arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, &l);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not verify pcr banks: %m");
}
_cleanup_free_ char *joined = strv_join(l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, ", ");
if (!joined)
return log_oom();
/* Note: we don't directly measure the volume key, it might be a security problem to send an
* unprotected direct hash of the secret volume key over the wire to the TPM. Hence let's instead
* send a HMAC signature instead. */
_cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL;
escaped = xescape(name, ":"); /* avoid ambiguity around ":" once we join things below */
if (!escaped)
return log_oom();
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
s = strjoin("cryptsetup:", escaped, ":", strempty(crypt_get_uuid(cd)));
if (!s)
return log_oom();
r = tpm2_pcr_extend_bytes(c, l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(s), &IOVEC_MAKE(volume_key, volume_key_size), TPM2_EVENT_VOLUME_KEY, s);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not extend PCR: %m");
log_struct(LOG_INFO,
LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_TPM_PCR_EXTEND_STR),
LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended PCR index %u with '%s' and volume key (banks %s).", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, s, joined),
LOG_ITEM("MEASURING=%s", s),
LOG_ITEM("PCR=%u", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr),
LOG_ITEM("BANKS=%s", joined));
return 0;
#else
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring volume key.");
#endif
}
static int measure_keyslot(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *mechanism,
int keyslot) {
int r;
assert(cd);
assert(name);
if (!arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr) {
log_debug("Not measuring unlock keyslot, deactivated.");
return 0;
}
r = efi_measured_uki(LOG_WARNING);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
log_debug("Kernel stub did not measure kernel image into the expected PCR, skipping userspace key slot measurement, too.");
return 0;
}
#if HAVE_TPM2
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL;
r = tpm2_context_new_or_warn(arg_tpm2_device, &c);
if (r < 0)
return r;
_cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL;
escaped = xescape(name, ":"); /* avoid ambiguity around ":" once we join things below */
if (!escaped)
return log_oom();
_cleanup_free_ char *k = NULL;
if (keyslot >= 0 && asprintf(&k, "%i", keyslot) < 0)
return log_oom();
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
s = strjoin("cryptsetup-keyslot:", escaped, ":", strempty(crypt_get_uuid(cd)), ":", strempty(mechanism), ":", strempty(k));
if (!s)
return log_oom();
r = tpm2_nvpcr_extend_bytes(c, /* session= */ NULL, arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(s), /* secret= */ NULL, TPM2_EVENT_KEYSLOT, s);
if (r == -ENETDOWN) {
/* NvPCR is not initialized yet. Do so now. */
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec anchor_secret = {};
r = tpm2_nvpcr_acquire_anchor_secret(&anchor_secret, /* sync_secondary= */ false);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = tpm2_nvpcr_initialize(c, /* session= */ NULL, arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, &anchor_secret);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extend NvPCR index '%s' with anchor secret: %m", name);
r = tpm2_nvpcr_extend_bytes(c, /* session= */ NULL, arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(s), /* secret= */ NULL, TPM2_EVENT_KEYSLOT, s);
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not extend NvPCR: %m");
log_struct(LOG_INFO,
"MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_TPM_NVPCR_EXTEND_STR,
LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended NvPCR index '%s' with '%s'.", arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, s),
"MEASURING=%s", s,
"NVPCR=%s", arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr);
return 0;
#else
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring keyslot.");
#endif
}
static int log_external_activation(int r, const char *volume) {
assert(volume);
log_notice_errno(r, "Volume '%s' has been activated externally while we have been trying to activate it.", volume);
return 0;
}
static int measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *mechanism,
int keyslot,
const void *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size,
uint32_t flags) {
int r;
assert(cd);
assert(name);
/* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_volume_key() which also measures to a PCR if that's requested. */
r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, flags);
if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
return log_external_activation(r, name);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (volume_key_size > 0)
(void) measure_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size); /* OK if fails */
else
log_debug("Not measuring volume key, none specified.");
(void) measure_keyslot(cd, name, mechanism, keyslot); /* ditto */
return r;
}
static int measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *mechanism,
int keyslot,
const char *passphrase,
size_t passphrase_size,
uint32_t flags) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *vk = NULL;
size_t vks;
int r;
assert(cd);
/* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_passphrase() which also measures to a PCR if that's
* requested. Note that we need the volume key for the measurement, and
* crypt_activate_by_passphrase() doesn't give us access to this. Hence, we operate indirectly, and
* retrieve the volume key first, and then activate through that. */
if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) {
log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated.");
goto shortcut;
}
r = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
log_debug("Not measuring volume key, none defined.");
goto shortcut;
}
vk = malloc(vks = r);
if (!vk)
return -ENOMEM;
keyslot = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, keyslot, vk, &vks, passphrase, passphrase_size);
if (keyslot < 0)
return keyslot;
return measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, mechanism, name, keyslot, vk, vks, flags);
shortcut:
keyslot = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
if (keyslot == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
return log_external_activation(keyslot, name);
if (keyslot < 0)
return keyslot;
(void) measure_keyslot(cd, name, mechanism, keyslot);
return keyslot;
}
static int attach_tcrypt(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
TokenType token_type,
const char *key_file,
const struct iovec *key_data,
char **passwords,
uint32_t flags) {
int r = 0;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *passphrase = NULL;
struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
.flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES,
.keyfiles = (const char **)arg_tcrypt_keyfiles,
.keyfiles_count = strv_length(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles)
};
assert(cd);
assert(name);
assert(key_file || key_data || !strv_isempty(passwords));
if (token_type >= 0)
/* Ask for a regular password */
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11/fido2/tpm2 support.");
if (arg_tcrypt_hidden)
params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER;
if (arg_tcrypt_system)
params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER;
if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt)
params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES;
if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt && arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim != 0)
params.veracrypt_pim = arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim;
if (key_data) {
params.passphrase = key_data->iov_base;
params.passphrase_size = key_data->iov_len;
r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
} else if (key_file) {
r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase);
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read password file '%s': %m", key_file);
return -EAGAIN; /* log with the actual error, but return EAGAIN */
}
params.passphrase = passphrase;
params.passphrase_size = strlen(passphrase);
r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
} else {
r = -EINVAL;
STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords){
params.passphrase = *p;
params.passphrase_size = strlen(*p);
r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
if (r >= 0)
break;
}
}
if (r < 0) {
if (r == -EPERM) {
if (key_data)
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using discovered key. (Key not correct?)");
else if (key_file)
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using password file '%s'. (Key data not correct?)", key_file);
else
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using supplied passwords.");
return r;
}
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load tcrypt superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
}
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
cd,
name,
/* mechanism= */ NULL,
/* keyslot= */ -1,
/* volume_key= */ NULL,
/* volume_key_size= */ 0,
flags);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate tcrypt device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
return 0;
}
static char *make_bindname(const char *volume, TokenType token_type) {
const char *token_type_name = token_type_to_string(token_type), *suffix;
char *bindname;
int r;
switch (token_type) {
case TOKEN_FIDO2:
suffix = "-salt";
break;
default:
suffix = NULL;
}
r = asprintf(&bindname,
"@%" PRIx64"/cryptsetup%s%s%s/%s",
random_u64(),
token_type_name ? "-" : "",
strempty(token_type_name),
strempty(suffix),
volume);
if (r < 0)
return NULL;
return bindname;
}
static int make_security_device_monitor(
sd_event **ret_event,
sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) {
_cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
int r;
assert(ret_event);
assert(ret_monitor);
/* Waits for a device with "security-device" tag to show up in udev */
log_debug("Creating device monitor for tag 'security-device' with timeout %s",
FORMAT_TIMESPAN(arg_token_timeout_usec, 1*USEC_PER_SEC));
r = sd_event_default(&event);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m");
r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT));
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m");
r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m");
(void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "security-device");
r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_tag(monitor, "security-device");
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m");
r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m");
r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m");
*ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event);
*ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor);
return 0;
}
static int run_security_device_monitor(
sd_event *event,
sd_device_monitor *monitor) {
bool processed = false;
int r;
assert(event);
assert(monitor);
/* Runs the event loop for the device monitor until either something happens, or the timeout is
* hit. */
for (;;) {
int x;
r = sd_event_get_exit_code(event, &x);
if (r < 0) {
if (r != -ENODATA)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query exit code from event loop: %m");
/* On ENODATA we aren't told to exit yet. */
} else {
assert(x == -ETIMEDOUT);
return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"Timed out waiting for security device, aborting security device based authentication attempt.");
}
/* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no further ones */
r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m");
if (r == 0) /* no events queued anymore */
return 0;
processed = true;
}
}
static bool use_token_plugins(void) {
#if HAVE_TPM2
/* Currently, there's no way for us to query the volume key when plugins are used. Hence don't use
* plugins, if measurement has been requested. */
if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr != UINT_MAX)
return false;
if (arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr)
return false;
#endif
/* Disable tokens if we're in FIDO2 mode with manual parameters. */
if (arg_fido2_cid)
return false;
#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
int r;
/* Permit a way to disable libcryptsetup token module support, for debugging purposes. */
r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE");
if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE env var: %m");
if (r == 0)
return false;
return crypt_token_external_path();
#else
return false;
#endif
}
#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
static int acquire_pins_from_env_variable(char ***ret_pins) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *envpin = NULL;
_cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL;
int r;
assert(ret_pins);
r = getenv_steal_erase("PIN", &envpin);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire PIN from environment: %m");
if (r > 0) {
pins = strv_new(envpin);
if (!pins)
return log_oom();
}
*ret_pins = TAKE_PTR(pins);
return 0;
}
#endif
static int crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *type,
usec_t until,
void *userdata,
uint32_t activation_flags,
const char *message,
const char *keyring,
const char *credential) {
#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags;
_cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL;
int r;
r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, /* pin=*/ NULL, /* pin_size= */ 0, userdata, activation_flags);
if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
return 0;
if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
return log_external_activation(r, name);
if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */
return r;
r = acquire_pins_from_env_variable(&pins);
if (r < 0)
return r;
STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) {
r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), userdata, activation_flags);
if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
return 0;
if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
return log_external_activation(r, name);
if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */
return r;
}
if (FLAGS_SET(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "PIN querying disabled via 'headless' option. Use the '$PIN' environment variable.");
for (;;) {
pins = strv_free_erase(pins);
AskPasswordRequest req = {
.tty_fd = -EBADF,
.message = message,
.icon = "drive-harddisk",
.keyring = keyring,
.credential = credential,
.until = until,
.hup_fd = -EBADF,
};
r = ask_password_auto(&req, flags, &pins);
if (r < 0)
return r;
STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) {
r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), userdata, activation_flags);
if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
return 0;
if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
return log_external_activation(r, name);
if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */
return r;
}
flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED;
}
return r;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
static int attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
usec_t until,
void *userdata,
uint32_t activation_flags) {
return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
cd,
name,
"systemd-fido2",
until,
userdata,
activation_flags,
"Please enter security token PIN:",
"fido2-pin",
"cryptsetup.fido2-pin");
}
static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *key_file,
const struct iovec *key_data,
usec_t until,
uint32_t flags,
bool pass_volume_key) {
_cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
size_t decrypted_key_size;
_cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL;
int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = use_token_plugins();
assert(cd);
assert(name);
assert(arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto);
if (arg_fido2_cid && !key_file && !iovec_is_set(key_data))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"FIDO2 mode with manual parameters selected, but no keyfile specified, refusing.");
friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
if (!friendly)
return log_oom();
for (;;) {
if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && !arg_fido2_cid) {
r = attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, arg_fido2_device, flags);
if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO, -ENOENT))
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"Automatic FIDO2 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
} else {
if (arg_fido2_cid)
r = acquire_fido2_key(
name,
friendly,
arg_fido2_device,
arg_fido2_rp_id,
arg_fido2_cid, arg_fido2_cid_size,
key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
key_data,
until,
arg_fido2_manual_flags,
"cryptsetup.fido2-pin",
arg_ask_password_flags,
&decrypted_key,
&decrypted_key_size);
else
r = acquire_fido2_key_auto(
cd,
name,
friendly,
arg_fido2_device,
until,
"cryptsetup.fido2-pin",
arg_ask_password_flags,
&decrypted_key,
&decrypted_key_size);
if (r >= 0)
break;
}
if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */
return r;
if (!monitor) {
/* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's
* create an event loop and monitor first. */
assert(!event);
r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor);
if (r < 0)
return r;
log_notice("Security token not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", friendly);
/* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed
* to create and configure the monitor */
continue;
}
r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor);
if (r < 0)
return r;
log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning FIDO2...");
}
if (pass_volume_key)
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
cd,
name,
"fido2",
/* keyslot= */ -1,
decrypted_key,
decrypted_key_size,
flags);
else {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
ssize_t base64_encoded_size;
/* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */
base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
if (base64_encoded_size < 0)
return log_oom();
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(
cd,
name,
"fido2",
keyslot,
base64_encoded,
base64_encoded_size,
flags);
}
if (r == -EPERM) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 acquired key: %m");
return 0;
}
static int attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *friendly_name,
usec_t until,
const char *askpw_credential,
uint32_t flags) {
#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
int r;
if (!streq_ptr(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata requires LUKS2 device.");
systemd_pkcs11_plugin_params params = {
.friendly_name = friendly_name,
.until = until,
.askpw_credential = askpw_credential,
.askpw_flags = arg_ask_password_flags,
};
r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, "systemd-pkcs11", CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0, &params, flags);
if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
r = 0;
if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
r = log_external_activation(r, name);
return r;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *key_file,
const struct iovec *key_data,
usec_t until,
uint32_t flags,
bool pass_volume_key) {
_cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *discovered_uri = NULL;
size_t decrypted_key_size = 0, discovered_key_size = 0;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *discovered_key = NULL;
struct iovec discovered_key_data = {};
int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
const char *uri = NULL;
bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = use_token_plugins();
assert(cd);
assert(name);
assert(arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto);
if (arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) {
if (!use_libcryptsetup_plugin) {
r = find_pkcs11_auto_data(cd, &discovered_uri, &discovered_key, &discovered_key_size, &keyslot);
if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO))
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"Automatic PKCS#11 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
if (r < 0)
return r;
uri = discovered_uri;
discovered_key_data = IOVEC_MAKE(discovered_key, discovered_key_size);
key_data = &discovered_key_data;
}
} else {
uri = arg_pkcs11_uri;
if (!key_file && !iovec_is_set(key_data))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing.");
}
friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
if (!friendly)
return log_oom();
for (;;) {
if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && arg_pkcs11_uri_auto)
r = attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin(
cd,
name,
friendly,
until,
"cryptsetup.pkcs11-pin",
flags);
else {
r = decrypt_pkcs11_key(
name,
friendly,
uri,
key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
key_data,
until,
arg_ask_password_flags,
&decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
if (r >= 0)
break;
}
if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */
return r;
if (!monitor) {
/* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's
* create an event loop and monitor first. */
assert(!event);
r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor);
if (r < 0)
return r;
log_notice("Security token%s%s not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.",
uri ? " " : "", strempty(uri), friendly);
/* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed
* to create and configure the monitor */
continue;
}
r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor);
if (r < 0)
return r;
log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning PKCS#11...");
}
assert(decrypted_key);
if (pass_volume_key)
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
cd,
name,
"pkcs11",
/* keyslot= */ -1,
decrypted_key,
decrypted_key_size,
flags);
else {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
ssize_t base64_encoded_size;
/* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility
* with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through
* PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do
* not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most
* importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string
* without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob
* via base64 encoding. */
base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
if (base64_encoded_size < 0)
return log_oom();
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(
cd,
name,
"pkcs11",
keyslot,
base64_encoded,
base64_encoded_size,
flags);
}
if (r == -EPERM) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 acquired key: %m");
return 0;
}
static int make_tpm2_device_monitor(
sd_event **ret_event,
sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) {
_cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
int r;
assert(ret_event);
assert(ret_monitor);
r = sd_event_default(&event);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m");
r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT));
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m");
r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m");
(void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "tpmrm");
r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_subsystem_devtype(monitor, "tpmrm", NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m");
r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m");
r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m");
*ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event);
*ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor);
return 0;
}
static int attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
usec_t until,
uint32_t flags) {
#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
systemd_tpm2_plugin_params params = {
.search_pcr_mask = arg_tpm2_pcr_mask,
.device = arg_tpm2_device,
.signature_path = arg_tpm2_signature,
.pcrlock_path = arg_tpm2_pcrlock,
};
if (!use_token_plugins())
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"libcryptsetup has external plugins support disabled.");
return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
cd,
name,
"systemd-tpm2",
until,
&params,
flags,
"Please enter TPM2 PIN:",
"tpm2-pin",
"cryptsetup.tpm2-pin");
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *key_file,
const struct iovec *key_data,
usec_t until,
uint32_t flags,
bool pass_volume_key) {
_cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec decrypted_key = {};
_cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL;
int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
assert(cd);
assert(name);
assert(arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto);
friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
if (!friendly)
return log_oom();
for (;;) {
if (key_file || iovec_is_set(key_data)) {
/* If key data is specified, use that */
r = acquire_tpm2_key(
name,
arg_tpm2_device,
arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX ? TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT_LEGACY : arg_tpm2_pcr_mask,
UINT16_MAX,
/* pubkey= */ NULL,
/* pubkey_pcr_mask= */ 0,
/* signature_path= */ NULL,
/* pcrlock_path= */ NULL,
/* primary_alg= */ 0,
key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
key_data, /* n_blobs= */ 1,
/* policy_hash= */ NULL, /* we don't know the policy hash */
/* n_policy_hash= */ 0,
/* salt= */ NULL,
/* srk= */ NULL,
/* pcrlock_nv= */ NULL,
arg_tpm2_pin ? TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN : 0,
until,
"cryptsetup.tpm2-pin",
arg_ask_password_flags,
&decrypted_key);
if (r >= 0)
break;
if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
/* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */
if (r != -EAGAIN) {
log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m");
return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */
}
} else {
r = attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, flags);
if (r >= 0)
return 0;
/* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found
* EOPNOTSUPP means: no libcryptsetup plugins support */
if (r == -ENXIO)
return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
if (r == -ENOENT)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header or TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
if (!IN_SET(r, -EOPNOTSUPP, -EAGAIN)) {
log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m");
return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */
}
}
if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) { /* Plugin not available, let's process TPM2 stuff right here instead */
bool found_some = false;
int token = 0; /* first token to look at */
/* If no key data is specified, look for it in the header. In order to support
* software upgrades we'll iterate through all suitable tokens, maybe one of them
* works. */
for (;;) {
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec pubkey = {}, salt = {}, srk = {}, pcrlock_nv = {};
struct iovec *blobs = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL;
uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, pubkey_pcr_mask;
size_t n_blobs = 0, n_policy_hash = 0;
uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg;
TPM2Flags tpm2_flags;
CLEANUP_ARRAY(blobs, n_blobs, iovec_array_free);
CLEANUP_ARRAY(policy_hash, n_policy_hash, iovec_array_free);
r = find_tpm2_auto_data(
cd,
arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, /* if != UINT32_MAX we'll only look for tokens with this PCR mask */
token, /* search for the token with this index, or any later index than this */
&hash_pcr_mask,
&pcr_bank,
&pubkey,
&pubkey_pcr_mask,
&primary_alg,
&blobs,
&n_blobs,
&policy_hash,
&n_policy_hash,
&salt,
&srk,
&pcrlock_nv,
&tpm2_flags,
&keyslot,
&token);
if (r == -ENXIO)
/* No further TPM2 tokens found in the LUKS2 header. */
return log_full_errno(found_some ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_DEBUG,
SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
found_some
? "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking."
: "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
/* TPM2 support not compiled in? */
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
if (r < 0)
return r;
found_some = true;
r = acquire_tpm2_key(
name,
arg_tpm2_device,
hash_pcr_mask,
pcr_bank,
&pubkey,
pubkey_pcr_mask,
arg_tpm2_signature,
arg_tpm2_pcrlock,
primary_alg,
/* key_file= */ NULL, /* key_file_size= */ 0, /* key_file_offset= */ 0, /* no key file */
blobs,
n_blobs,
policy_hash,
n_policy_hash,
&salt,
&srk,
&pcrlock_nv,
tpm2_flags,
until,
"cryptsetup.tpm2-pin",
arg_ask_password_flags,
&decrypted_key);
if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK))
return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
if (r != -EPERM)
break;
token++; /* try a different token next time */
}
if (r >= 0)
break;
/* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */
if (r != -EAGAIN) {
log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m");
return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */
}
}
if (!monitor) {
/* We didn't find the TPM2 device. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's create
* an event loop and monitor first. */
assert(!event);
if (is_efi_boot() && !efi_has_tpm2())
return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"No TPM2 hardware discovered and EFI firmware does not see it either, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
r = make_tpm2_device_monitor(&event, &monitor);
if (r < 0)
return r;
log_info("TPM2 device not present for unlocking %s, waiting for it to become available.", friendly);
/* Let's immediately rescan in case the device appeared in the time we needed
* to create and configure the monitor */
continue;
}
r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor);
if (r < 0)
return r;
log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning for TPM2...");
}
if (pass_volume_key)
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
cd,
name,
"tpm2",
/* keyslot= */ -1,
decrypted_key.iov_base,
decrypted_key.iov_len,
flags);
else {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
ssize_t base64_encoded_size;
/* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */
base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key.iov_base, decrypted_key.iov_len, &base64_encoded);
if (base64_encoded_size < 0)
return log_oom();
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(
cd,
name,
"tpm2",
keyslot,
base64_encoded,
base64_encoded_size,
flags);
}
if (r == -EPERM) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 acquired key: %m");
return 0;
}
static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const struct iovec *key_data,
uint32_t flags,
bool pass_volume_key) {
int r;
assert(cd);
assert(name);
assert(key_data);
if (pass_volume_key)
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, /* keyslot= */ -1, key_data->iov_base, key_data->iov_len, flags);
else
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, arg_key_slot, key_data->iov_base, key_data->iov_len, flags);
if (r == -EPERM) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate. (Key incorrect?)");
return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate: %m");
return 0;
}
static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *key_file,
uint32_t flags,
bool pass_volume_key) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *kfdata = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL;
size_t kfsize;
int r;
assert(cd);
assert(name);
assert(key_file);
/* If we read the key via AF_UNIX, make this client recognizable */
bindname = make_bindname(name, /* token_type= */ _TOKEN_TYPE_INVALID);
if (!bindname)
return log_oom();
r = read_full_file_full(
AT_FDCWD, key_file,
arg_keyfile_offset == 0 ? UINT64_MAX : arg_keyfile_offset,
arg_keyfile_size == 0 ? SIZE_MAX : arg_keyfile_size,
READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE|READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET,
bindname,
&kfdata, &kfsize);
if (r == -E2BIG) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' too large.", key_file);
return -EAGAIN;
}
if (r == -ENOENT) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' missing.", key_file);
return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read key file '%s': %m", key_file);
if (pass_volume_key)
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, /* keyslot= */ -1, kfdata, kfsize, flags);
else
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, arg_key_slot, kfdata, kfsize, flags);
if (r == -EPERM) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key data incorrect?)", key_file);
return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file);
return 0;
}
static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
char **passwords,
uint32_t flags,
bool pass_volume_key) {
int r;
assert(cd);
assert(name);
r = -EINVAL;
STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
if (pass_volume_key)
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, /* keyslot= */ -1, *p, arg_key_size, flags);
else
r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, arg_key_slot, *p, strlen(*p), flags);
if (r >= 0)
break;
}
if (r == -EPERM) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase. (Passphrase incorrect?)");
return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase: %m");
return 0;
}
static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
TokenType token_type,
const char *key_file,
const struct iovec *key_data,
char **passwords,
uint32_t flags,
usec_t until) {
bool pass_volume_key = false;
int r;
assert(cd);
assert(name);
if ((!arg_type && !crypt_get_type(cd)) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
struct crypt_params_plain params = {
.offset = arg_offset,
.skip = arg_skip,
.sector_size = arg_sector_size,
};
const char *cipher, *cipher_mode;
_cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL;
if (streq_ptr(arg_hash, "plain"))
/* plain isn't a real hash type. it just means "use no hash" */
params.hash = NULL;
else if (arg_hash)
params.hash = arg_hash;
else if (!key_file)
/* for CRYPT_PLAIN, the behaviour of cryptsetup package is to not hash when a key
* file is provided */
params.hash = "ripemd160";
if (arg_cipher) {
size_t l;
l = strcspn(arg_cipher, "-");
truncated_cipher = strndup(arg_cipher, l);
if (!truncated_cipher)
return log_oom();
cipher = truncated_cipher;
cipher_mode = arg_cipher[l] ? arg_cipher+l+1 : "plain";
} else {
cipher = "aes";
cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
}
/* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads from keyfile to key length, and ignore keyfile-size */
arg_keyfile_size = arg_key_size;
/* In contrast to what the name crypt_format() might suggest this doesn't actually format
* anything, it just configures encryption parameters when used for plain mode. */
r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, &params);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Loading of cryptographic parameters failed: %m");
/* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */
pass_volume_key = !params.hash;
}
log_info("Set cipher %s, mode %s, key size %i bits for device %s.",
crypt_get_cipher(cd),
crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd),
crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8,
crypt_get_device_name(cd));
if (token_type == TOKEN_TPM2)
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
if (token_type == TOKEN_FIDO2)
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
if (token_type == TOKEN_PKCS11)
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
if (key_data)
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(cd, name, key_data, flags, pass_volume_key);
if (key_file)
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file(cd, name, key_file, flags, pass_volume_key);
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase(cd, name, passwords, flags, pass_volume_key);
}
static int help(void) {
_cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL;
int r;
r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-cryptsetup", "8", &link);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
printf("%1$s attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [CONFIG]\n"
"%1$s detach VOLUME\n\n"
"%2$sAttach or detach an encrypted block device.%3$s\n\n"
" -h --help Show this help\n"
" --version Show package version\n"
"\nSee the %4$s for details.\n",
program_invocation_short_name,
ansi_highlight(),
ansi_normal(),
link);
return 0;
}
static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
enum {
ARG_VERSION = 0x100,
};
static const struct option options[] = {
{ "help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' },
{ "version", no_argument, NULL, ARG_VERSION },
{}
};
int c;
assert(argc >= 0);
assert(argv);
if (argv_looks_like_help(argc, argv))
return help();
while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "h", options, NULL)) >= 0)
switch (c) {
case 'h':
return help();
case ARG_VERSION:
return version();
case '?':
return -EINVAL;
default:
assert_not_reached();
}
return 1;
}
static uint32_t determine_flags(void) {
uint32_t flags = 0;
if (arg_readonly)
flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
if (arg_discards)
flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
if (arg_same_cpu_crypt)
flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
if (arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus)
flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
if (arg_no_read_workqueue)
flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE;
if (arg_no_write_workqueue)
flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE;
#ifdef CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF
/* Try to decrease the risk of OOM event if memory hard key derivation function is in use */
/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues/446/ */
flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF;
#endif
return flags;
}
static void remove_and_erasep(const char **p) {
int r;
if (!*p)
return;
r = unlinkat_deallocate(AT_FDCWD, *p, UNLINK_ERASE);
if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to erase key file '%s', ignoring: %m", *p);
}
static TokenType determine_token_type(void) {
if (arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto)
return TOKEN_TPM2;
if (arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto)
return TOKEN_FIDO2;
if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto)
return TOKEN_PKCS11;
return _TOKEN_TYPE_INVALID;
}
static int discover_key(const char *key_file, const char *volume, TokenType token_type, struct iovec *ret_key_data) {
_cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL;
const char *token_type_name;
int r;
assert(key_file);
assert(volume);
assert(ret_key_data);
bindname = make_bindname(volume, token_type);
if (!bindname)
return log_oom();
/* If a key file is not explicitly specified, search for a key in a well defined search path, and load it. */
r = find_key_file(key_file, STRV_MAKE("/etc/cryptsetup-keys.d", "/run/cryptsetup-keys.d"), bindname, ret_key_data);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
token_type_name = token_type_to_string(token_type);
if (token_type_name)
log_debug("Automatically discovered encrypted key for volume '%s' (token type: %s).", volume, token_type_name);
else
log_debug("Automatically discovered key for volume '%s'.", volume);
return r;
}
static int verb_attach(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
_cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
_unused_ _cleanup_(remove_and_erasep) const char *destroy_key_file = NULL;
crypt_status_info status;
uint32_t flags = 0;
unsigned tries;
usec_t until;
PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE;
int r;
/* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [CONFIG] */
assert(argc >= 3 && argc <= 5);
const char *volume = ASSERT_PTR(argv[1]),
*source = ASSERT_PTR(argv[2]),
*key_file = argc >= 4 ? mangle_none(argv[3]) : NULL,
*config = argc >= 5 ? mangle_none(argv[4]) : NULL;
if (!filename_is_valid(volume))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume);
if (key_file && !path_is_absolute(key_file)) {
log_warning("Password file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", key_file);
key_file = NULL;
}
if (config) {
r = parse_crypt_config(config);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
log_debug("%s %s ← %s type=%s cipher=%s", __func__,
volume, source, strempty(arg_type), strempty(arg_cipher));
/* A delicious drop of snake oil */
(void) mlockall(MCL_FUTURE);
if (key_file && arg_keyfile_erase)
destroy_key_file = key_file; /* let's get this baby erased when we leave */
if (arg_header) {
if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT)){
log_debug("tcrypt header: %s", arg_header);
r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, arg_header, source);
} else {
log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header);
r = crypt_init(&cd, arg_header);
}
} else
r = crypt_init(&cd, source);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init() failed: %m");
cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);
status = crypt_status(cd, volume);
if (IN_SET(status, CRYPT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_BUSY)) {
log_info("Volume %s already active.", volume);
return 0;
}
flags = determine_flags();
until = usec_add(now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC), arg_timeout);
if (until == USEC_INFINITY)
until = 0;
if (arg_key_size == 0)
arg_key_size = 256U / 8U;
if (key_file) {
struct stat st;
/* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a warning it's OK to do this
* in two steps. */
if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005))
log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file);
}
if (!arg_type || STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2)) {
r = crypt_load(cd, !arg_type || streq(arg_type, ANY_LUKS) ? CRYPT_LUKS : arg_type, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
/* since cryptsetup 2.7.0 (Jan 2024) */
#if HAVE_CRYPT_SET_KEYRING_TO_LINK
if (arg_link_key_description) {
r = crypt_set_keyring_to_link(cd, arg_link_key_description, NULL, arg_link_key_type, arg_link_keyring);
if (r < 0)
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to set keyring or key description to link volume key in, ignoring: %m");
}
#endif
if (arg_header) {
r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, source);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set LUKS data device %s: %m", source);
}
/* Tokens are available in LUKS2 only, but it is ok to call (and fail) with LUKS1. */
if (!key_file && use_token_plugins()) {
r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
cd,
volume,
/* type= */ NULL,
until,
/* userdata= */ NULL,
flags,
"Please enter LUKS2 token PIN:",
"luks2-pin",
"cryptsetup.luks2-pin");
if (r >= 0) {
log_debug("Volume %s activated with a LUKS token.", volume);
return 0;
}
log_debug_errno(r, "Token activation unsuccessful for device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
}
}
/* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */
#ifdef CRYPT_BITLK
if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_BITLK)) {
r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load Bitlocker superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
}
#endif
bool use_cached_passphrase = true, try_discover_key = !key_file;
const char *discovered_key_fn = strjoina(volume, ".key");
_cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) {
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec discovered_key_data = {};
const struct iovec *key_data = NULL;
TokenType token_type = determine_token_type();
log_debug("Beginning attempt %u to unlock.", tries);
/* When we were able to acquire multiple keys, let's always process them in this order:
*
* 1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 or FIDO2 token, or TPM2 chip
* 2. The configured or discovered key, of which both are exclusive and optional
* 3. The empty password, in case arg_try_empty_password is set
* 4. We enquire the user for a password
*/
if (try_discover_key) {
r = discover_key(discovered_key_fn, volume, token_type, &discovered_key_data);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
key_data = &discovered_key_data;
}
if (token_type < 0 && !key_file && !key_data && !passwords) {
/* If we have nothing to try anymore, then acquire a new password */
if (arg_try_empty_password) {
/* Hmm, let's try an empty password now, but only once */
arg_try_empty_password = false;
key_data = &iovec_empty;
} else {
/* Ask the user for a passphrase or recovery key only as last resort, if we
* have nothing else to check for */
if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE) {
passphrase_type = check_registered_passwords(cd);
if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "No passphrase or recovery key registered.");
}
r = get_password(
volume,
source,
until,
/* ignore_cached= */ !use_cached_passphrase || arg_verify,
passphrase_type,
&passwords);
use_cached_passphrase = false;
if (r == -EAGAIN)
continue;
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
}
if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT))
r = attach_tcrypt(cd, volume, token_type, key_file, key_data, passwords, flags);
else
r = attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(cd, volume, token_type, key_file, key_data, passwords, flags, until);
if (r >= 0)
break;
if (r != -EAGAIN)
return r;
/* Key not correct? Let's try again, but let's invalidate one of the passed fields, so that
* we fall back to the next best thing. */
if (token_type == TOKEN_TPM2) {
arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device);
arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
continue;
}
if (token_type == TOKEN_FIDO2) {
arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device);
arg_fido2_device_auto = false;
continue;
}
if (token_type == TOKEN_PKCS11) {
arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri);
arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false;
continue;
}
if (try_discover_key) {
try_discover_key = false;
continue;
}
if (key_file) {
key_file = NULL;
continue;
}
if (passwords) {
passwords = strv_free_erase(passwords);
continue;
}
log_debug("Prepared for next attempt to unlock.");
}
if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to activate; giving up.");
return 0;
}
static int verb_detach(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
_cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
const char *volume = ASSERT_PTR(argv[1]);
int r;
assert(argc == 2);
if (!filename_is_valid(volume))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume);
r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, volume);
if (r == -ENODEV) {
log_info("Volume %s already inactive.", volume);
return 0;
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init_by_name() for volume '%s' failed: %m", volume);
cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);
r = crypt_deactivate(cd, volume);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to deactivate '%s': %m", volume);
return 0;
}
static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
int r;
log_setup();
umask(0022);
r = parse_argv(argc, argv);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
cryptsetup_enable_logging(NULL);
static const Verb verbs[] = {
{ "attach", 3, 5, 0, verb_attach },
{ "detach", 2, 2, 0, verb_detach },
{}
};
return dispatch_verb(argc, argv, verbs, NULL);
}
DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION(run);
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