Files
systemd/src/shared/mount-setup.c
Daan De Meyer 886c078702 mount-setup: Add memory_hugetlb_accounting to cgroupfs mount
This mount option will count HugeTLB memory usage towards the cgroup’s
overall memory usage for the memory controller.

See https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231006184629.155543-4-nphamcs@gmail.com/T/#u
for the patch introducing the new mount option.
2025-10-30 22:28:41 +01:00

551 lines
20 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "conf-files.h"
#include "dev-setup.h"
#include "efivars.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "label-util.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "mkdir-label.h"
#include "mount-setup.h"
#include "mount-util.h"
#include "mountpoint-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "recurse-dir.h"
#include "smack-util.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
#include "time-util.h"
#include "virt.h"
typedef enum MountMode {
MNT_FATAL = 1 << 0,
MNT_IN_CONTAINER = 1 << 1,
MNT_CHECK_WRITABLE = 1 << 2,
MNT_FOLLOW_SYMLINK = 1 << 3,
} MountMode;
typedef struct MountPoint {
const char *what;
const char *where;
const char *type;
const char *options;
int (*options_fn)(int priority, const char *type, char **ret);
unsigned long flags;
MountMode mode;
bool (*condition_fn)(void);
} MountPoint;
static int cgroupfs_mount_options(int priority, const char *type, char **ret) {
int r;
assert(type);
assert(streq(type, "cgroup2"));
assert(ret);
_cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
FOREACH_STRING(o, "memory_recursiveprot", "memory_hugetlb_accounting") {
r = mount_option_supported("cgroup2", o, /* value = */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
log_full_errno(priority, r, "Failed to determine whether cgroupfs supports '%s' mount option, assuming not: %m", o);
else if (r == 0)
log_debug("'%s' not supported by cgroupfs, not using mount option.", o);
else if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", o))
return log_oom_full(priority);
}
*ret = TAKE_PTR(opts);
return 0;
}
int mount_cgroupfs(const char *path) {
int r;
assert(path);
/* Mount a separate cgroupfs instance, taking all options we initial set into account. This is
* especially useful when cgroup namespace is *not* employed, since the kernel overrides all
* previous options if a new mount is established in initial cgns (c.f.
* https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/b69bb476dee99d564d65d418e9a20acca6f32c3f/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c#L1984)
*/
_cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
r = cgroupfs_mount_options(LOG_WARNING, "cgroup2", &opts);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* These options shall be kept in sync with those in mount_table below. */
if (!strprepend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "nsdelegate"))
return log_oom();
return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_ERR, "cgroup2", path, "cgroup2", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
}
static int usrquota_mount_option(int priority, const char *type, char **ret) {
_cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL;
int r;
assert(type);
assert(ret);
r = mount_option_supported(type, "usrquota", /* value= */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
log_full_errno(priority, r, "Unable to determine whether %s supports 'usrquota' mount option, assuming not: %m", type);
else if (r == 0)
log_debug("Not enabling 'usrquota' for '%s' as kernel lacks support for it.", type);
else {
o = strdup("usrquota");
if (!o)
return log_oom_full(priority);
}
*ret = TAKE_PTR(o);
return 0;
}
static const MountPoint mount_table[] = {
{
.what = "proc",
.where = "/proc",
.type = "proc",
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
.mode = MNT_FATAL|MNT_IN_CONTAINER|MNT_FOLLOW_SYMLINK,
},
{
.what = "sysfs",
.where = "/sys",
.type = "sysfs",
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
.mode = MNT_FATAL|MNT_IN_CONTAINER,
},
{
.what = "devtmpfs",
.where = "/dev",
.type = "devtmpfs",
.options = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_DEV,
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME,
.mode = MNT_FATAL|MNT_IN_CONTAINER,
},
{
.what = "securityfs",
.where = "/sys/kernel/security",
.type = "securityfs",
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
},
#if ENABLE_SMACK
{
.what = "smackfs",
.where = "/sys/fs/smackfs",
.type = "smackfs",
.options = "smackfsdef=*",
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
.mode = MNT_FATAL,
.condition_fn = mac_smack_use,
},
{
.what = "tmpfs",
.where = "/dev/shm",
.type = "tmpfs",
.options = "mode=01777,smackfsroot=*",
.options_fn = usrquota_mount_option,
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
.mode = MNT_FATAL,
.condition_fn = mac_smack_use,
},
#endif
{
.what = "tmpfs",
.where = "/dev/shm",
.type = "tmpfs",
.options = "mode=01777",
.options_fn = usrquota_mount_option,
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
.mode = MNT_FATAL|MNT_IN_CONTAINER,
},
{
.what = "devpts",
.where = "/dev/pts",
.type = "devpts",
.options = "mode=" STRINGIFY(TTY_MODE) ",gid=" STRINGIFY(TTY_GID),
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
.mode = MNT_IN_CONTAINER,
},
#if ENABLE_SMACK
{
.what = "tmpfs",
.where = "/run",
.type = "tmpfs",
.options = "mode=0755,smackfsroot=*" TMPFS_LIMITS_RUN,
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
.mode = MNT_FATAL,
.condition_fn = mac_smack_use,
},
#endif
{
.what = "tmpfs",
.where = "/run",
.type = "tmpfs",
.options = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_RUN,
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
.mode = MNT_FATAL|MNT_IN_CONTAINER,
},
{
.what = "cgroup2",
.where = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
.type = "cgroup2",
.options = "nsdelegate",
.options_fn = cgroupfs_mount_options,
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
.mode = MNT_FATAL|MNT_IN_CONTAINER|MNT_CHECK_WRITABLE,
},
#if ENABLE_PSTORE
{
.what = "pstore",
.where = "/sys/fs/pstore",
.type = "pstore",
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
},
#endif
#if ENABLE_EFI
{
.what = "efivarfs",
.where = "/sys/firmware/efi/efivars",
.type = "efivarfs",
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
.condition_fn = is_efi_boot,
},
#endif
{
.what = "bpf",
.where = "/sys/fs/bpf",
.type = "bpf",
.options = "mode=0700",
.flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
},
};
/* The first three entries we might need before SELinux is up. The
* fourth (securityfs) is needed by IMA to load a custom policy. The
* other ones we can delay until SELinux and IMA are loaded. When
* SMACK is enabled we need smackfs, too, so it's a fifth one. */
#if ENABLE_SMACK
#define N_EARLY_MOUNT 5
#else
#define N_EARLY_MOUNT 4
#endif
assert_cc(N_EARLY_MOUNT <= ELEMENTSOF(mount_table));
bool mount_point_is_api(const char *path) {
/* Checks if this mount point is considered "API", and hence
* should be ignored */
FOREACH_ELEMENT(i, mount_table)
if (path_equal(path, i->where))
return true;
return path_startswith(path, "/sys/fs/cgroup/");
}
bool mount_point_ignore(const char *path) {
/* These are API file systems that might be mounted by other software, we just list them here so that
* we know that we should ignore them. */
FOREACH_STRING(i,
/* SELinux file systems */
"/sys/fs/selinux",
/* Container bind mounts */
"/dev/console",
"/proc/kmsg",
"/proc/sys",
"/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id")
if (path_equal(path, i))
return true;
if (path_startswith(path, "/run/host")) /* All mounts passed in from the container manager are
* something we better ignore. */
return true;
return false;
}
static int mount_one(const MountPoint *p, bool relabel) {
int r, priority;
assert(p);
assert(p->what);
assert(p->where);
assert(p->type);
priority = FLAGS_SET(p->mode, MNT_FATAL) ? LOG_ERR : LOG_DEBUG;
if (p->condition_fn && !p->condition_fn())
return 0;
/* Relabel first, just in case */
if (relabel)
(void) label_fix(p->where, LABEL_IGNORE_ENOENT|LABEL_IGNORE_EROFS);
r = path_is_mount_point_full(p->where, /* root = */ NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) {
log_full_errno(priority, r, "Failed to determine whether %s is a mount point: %m", p->where);
return FLAGS_SET(p->mode, MNT_FATAL) ? r : 0;
}
if (r > 0)
return 0;
if (!FLAGS_SET(p->mode, MNT_IN_CONTAINER) && detect_container() > 0)
return 0;
/* The access mode here doesn't really matter too much, since
* the mounted file system will take precedence anyway. */
if (relabel)
(void) mkdir_p_label(p->where, 0755);
else
(void) mkdir_p(p->where, 0755);
_cleanup_free_ char *extend_options = NULL;
const char *o;
if (p->options_fn) {
r = p->options_fn(priority, p->type, &extend_options);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (!strprepend_with_separator(&extend_options, ",", p->options))
return log_oom();
o = extend_options;
} else
o = p->options;
r = mount_verbose_full(priority, p->what, p->where, p->type, p->flags, o, FLAGS_SET(p->mode, MNT_FOLLOW_SYMLINK));
if (r < 0)
return FLAGS_SET(p->mode, MNT_FATAL) ? r : 0;
/* Relabel again, since we now mounted something fresh here */
if (relabel)
(void) label_fix(p->where, 0);
if (FLAGS_SET(p->mode, MNT_CHECK_WRITABLE))
if (access(p->where, W_OK) < 0) {
r = -errno;
(void) umount2(p->where, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
(void) rmdir(p->where);
log_full_errno(priority, r, "Mount point '%s' not writable after mounting, undoing: %m", p->where);
return FLAGS_SET(p->mode, MNT_FATAL) ? r : 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int mount_points_setup(size_t n, bool loaded_policy) {
int r = 0;
assert(n <= ELEMENTSOF(mount_table));
FOREACH_ARRAY(mp, mount_table, n)
RET_GATHER(r, mount_one(mp, loaded_policy));
return r;
}
int mount_setup_early(void) {
/* Do a minimal mount of /proc and friends to enable the most basic stuff, such as SELinux */
return mount_points_setup(N_EARLY_MOUNT, /* loaded_policy= */ false);
}
#if HAVE_SELINUX || ENABLE_SMACK
static int relabel_cb(
RecurseDirEvent event,
const char *path,
int dir_fd,
int inode_fd,
const struct dirent *de,
const struct statx *sx,
void *userdata) {
switch (event) {
case RECURSE_DIR_LEAVE:
case RECURSE_DIR_SKIP_MOUNT:
/* If we already saw this dirent when entering it or this is a dirent that on a different
* mount, don't relabel it. */
return RECURSE_DIR_CONTINUE;
case RECURSE_DIR_ENTER:
/* /run/initramfs/ + /run/nextroot/ are static data and big, no need to dynamically relabel
* its contents at boot... */
if (PATH_STARTSWITH_SET(path, "/run/initramfs", "/run/nextroot"))
return RECURSE_DIR_SKIP_ENTRY;
_fallthrough_;
default:
/* Otherwise, label it, even if we had trouble stat()ing it and similar. SELinux can figure this out */
(void) label_fix(path, 0);
return RECURSE_DIR_CONTINUE;
}
}
static int relabel_tree(const char *path) {
int r;
r = recurse_dir_at(AT_FDCWD, path, 0, UINT_MAX, RECURSE_DIR_ENSURE_TYPE|RECURSE_DIR_SAME_MOUNT, relabel_cb, NULL);
if (r < 0)
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to recursively relabel '%s': %m", path);
return r;
}
static int relabel_extra(void) {
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **files = NULL;
int r, c = 0;
/* Support for relabelling additional files or directories after loading the policy. For this, code in the
* initrd simply has to drop in *.relabel files into /run/systemd/relabel-extra.d/. We'll read all such files
* expecting one absolute path by line and will relabel each (and everyone below that in case the path refers
* to a directory). These drop-in files are supposed to be absolutely minimal, and do not understand comments
* and such. After the operation succeeded the files are removed, and the drop-in directory as well, if
* possible.
*/
r = conf_files_list(&files, ".relabel", NULL,
CONF_FILES_FILTER_MASKED | CONF_FILES_REGULAR,
"/run/systemd/relabel-extra.d/");
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to enumerate /run/systemd/relabel-extra.d/, ignoring: %m");
STRV_FOREACH(file, files) {
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL;
f = fopen(*file, "re");
if (!f) {
log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open %s, ignoring: %m", *file);
continue;
}
for (;;) {
_cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
r = read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line);
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to read %s, ignoring: %m", *file);
break;
}
if (r == 0) /* EOF */
break;
path_simplify(line);
if (!path_is_normalized(line)) {
log_warning("Path to relabel is not normalized, ignoring: %s", line);
continue;
}
if (!path_is_absolute(line)) {
log_warning("Path to relabel is not absolute, ignoring: %s", line);
continue;
}
log_debug("Relabelling additional file/directory '%s'.", line);
(void) label_fix(line, 0);
(void) relabel_tree(line);
c++;
}
if (unlink(*file) < 0)
log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to remove %s, ignoring: %m", *file);
}
/* Remove when we complete things. */
if (rmdir("/run/systemd/relabel-extra.d") < 0 &&
errno != ENOENT)
log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to remove /run/systemd/relabel-extra.d/ directory: %m");
return c;
}
#endif
int mount_setup(bool loaded_policy, bool leave_propagation) {
int r;
r = mount_points_setup(ELEMENTSOF(mount_table), loaded_policy);
if (r < 0)
return r;
#if HAVE_SELINUX || ENABLE_SMACK
/* Nodes in devtmpfs and /run need to be manually updated for
* the appropriate labels, after mounting. The other virtual
* API file systems like /sys and /proc do not need that, they
* use the same label for all their files. */
if (loaded_policy) {
usec_t before_relabel, after_relabel;
int n_extra;
before_relabel = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
FOREACH_STRING(i, "/dev", "/dev/shm", "/run")
(void) relabel_tree(i);
n_extra = relabel_extra();
after_relabel = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
log_info("Relabeled /dev/, /dev/shm/, /run/%s in %s.",
n_extra > 0 ? ", and additional files" : "",
FORMAT_TIMESPAN(after_relabel - before_relabel, 0));
}
#endif
/* Create a few default symlinks, which are normally created
* by udevd, but some scripts might need them before we start
* udevd. */
dev_setup(NULL, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
/* Mark the root directory as shared in regards to mount propagation. The kernel defaults to "private", but we
* think it makes more sense to have a default of "shared" so that nspawn and the container tools work out of
* the box. If specific setups need other settings they can reset the propagation mode to private if
* needed. Note that we set this only when we are invoked directly by the kernel. If we are invoked by a
* container manager we assume the container manager knows what it is doing (for example, because it set up
* some directories with different propagation modes). */
if (detect_container() <= 0 && !leave_propagation)
if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_REC|MS_SHARED, NULL) < 0)
log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to set up the root directory for shared mount propagation: %m");
/* Create a few directories we always want around, Note that sd_booted() checks for /run/systemd/system, so
* this mkdir really needs to stay for good, otherwise software that copied sd-daemon.c into their sources will
* misdetect systemd. */
(void) mkdir_label("/run/systemd", 0755);
(void) mkdir_label("/run/systemd/system", 0755);
/* Make sure there's always a place where sandboxed environments can mount root file systems they are
* about to move into, even when unprivileged, without having to create a temporary one in /tmp/
* (which they then have to keep track of and clean) */
(void) mkdir_label("/run/systemd/mount-rootfs", 0555);
/* Make sure we have a mount point to hide in sandboxes */
(void) mkdir_label("/run/credentials", 0755);
/* Also create /run/systemd/inaccessible nodes, so that we always have something to mount
* inaccessible nodes from. If we run in a container the host might have created these for us already
* in /run/host/inaccessible/. Use those if we can, since that way we likely get access to block/char
* device nodes that are inaccessible, and if userns is used to nodes that are on mounts owned by a
* userns outside the container and thus nicely read-only and not remountable. */
if (access("/run/host/inaccessible/", F_OK) < 0) {
if (errno != ENOENT)
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to check if /run/host/inaccessible exists, ignoring: %m");
(void) make_inaccessible_nodes("/run/systemd", UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
} else
(void) symlink("../host/inaccessible", "/run/systemd/inaccessible");
return 0;
}